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INTRODUCTION
LGBT equality and religious freedom increasingly appear to be on a
collision course.  The  Supreme  Court’s  decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 in
which the Court ruled that states may not exclude same sex couples from
1

F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law Emeritus, George Washington
University. I am grateful to Andy Koppelman, Dan Mach, Doug NeJaime, Jim Oleske, Liz
Sepper, and Bob Tuttle for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, prepared for a
Symposium hosted by the Alabama Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law Review on March
27, 2015, and to Bill Cohen and Harrington Park Press for generous promotional efforts.
The errors are mine.
2
135   S.   Ct.   2584   (2015)   (invalidating   Ohio’s   exclusion   of   same   sex   couples   from  
marriage). Obergefell was consolidated with Bourke v. Beshear, 135 S.Ct. 1041 (2015)
(Kentucky); Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S.Ct. 1040 (2015) (Tennessee); and DeBoer v. Snyder,
135 S.Ct. 1040 (2015) (Michigan). In Obergefell, several Justices made specific references
to concerns of religious freedom. See 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (Kennedy, J., opinion for the
Court); id. at 2625-26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2638-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
id. at 2643 (Alito, J, dissenting).

1
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marriage, has raised the intensity and political salience of this conflict.
Obergefell will energize an already growing movement to expand the
coverage of laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation or
gender identity, and simultaneously invigorate religious resistance to that
movement.
In the battles to come, the  Court’s  decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.3 (hereinafter   “Hobby Lobby”) will play a central role. Hobby
Lobby upheld a claim under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act4
(hereinafter   “federal   RFRA” or   “RFRA”) by a business corporation
objecting, on religious grounds, to the inclusion of certain contraceptives in
the  firm’s  health  insurance  policy  for  employees.   Inevitably, Hobby Lobby
and its vision of religious freedom will shape the conversation about the
enactment, content, and enforcement of LGBT anti-discrimination laws.
Hobby Lobby involved application of federal RFRA, a law that
restrains only the federal government, 5 to the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. The far broader topic of LGBT rights involves the
new regime of marriage equality, and the evolving bodies of federal, state,
and local law on both religious liberty and anti-discrimination. For all sides

3

134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb—2000bb-4 (2012). RFRA's command to the federal
government is succinctly set forth in id. §§ 2000bb-1:
a)In general
Government shall not substantially burden a   person’s   exercise  
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.
(b)Exception
Government   may   substantially   burden   a   person’s   exercise   of  
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
5
The decision in City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) held
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments. For an early and
important   take   on   how   the   Court’s   interpretation   of   federal   RFRA   in   Hobby Lobby may
influence the development of state law, see Kara Loewentheil, The Satanic Temple, Scott
Walker,   and   Contraception:   A   Partial   Account   of   Hobby   Lobby’s   Implications   for   State  
Law, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498637.
4
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in this conflict, the targets are multiplying, moving quickly, and interacting
rapidly.6
Consider how these questions map onto the venue for this symposium.
In mid-July, 2015, Alabama remained in conflict between federal court
orders to allow same sex marriage,7 and a state supreme court order to not
allow same sex marriage.8 Alabama also has a state RFRA enshrined in its
own constitution, 9 but it has no state statutory law that forbids
discrimination, based on sexual orientation or gender identity, in
employment or public accommodations. 10 When marriage equality fully
arrives in Alabama, how and why will Hobby Lobby, a decision applying
6

The most intense episodes in the Indiana RFRA controversy, discussed in Part III
infra, occurred soon after the delivery of an early draft of this paper to an audience at the
University of Alabama. The targets keep moving.
7
Searcy v. Strange, 81 F.Supp.3d 1285 (S.D. Ala. 2015) (holding unconstitutional
Alabama’s   exclusion   of   same   sex   couples   from   marriage).   When   the   order   in   Searcy
became effective, Alabama immediately experienced considerable legal uncertainty about
the status of same sex couples seeking to marry. See Sandhya Somashekhar, Judicial
Defiance in Alabama: Same Sex Marriages Begin, but Most Counties Refuse,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Feb.
9,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/alabama-judge-stakes-out-defiant-stance-against-same-sex-marriages/2015/02/09/
a1be2de4-b06f-11e4-854b-a38d13486ba1_story.html.
8
After the federal court ruling, the Alabama Supreme Court issued orders to the
state’s  probate  judges  to  not  issue  marriage  licenses  to  same  sex  couples.  Ex  parte  State  of  
Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752 (Ala. 2015). The
federal litigation then turned into  a  class  action  against  the  states’  probate  judges.  Strawser  
v. Strange, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8439 (S.D. Ala. 2015). On June 29, the Alabama
Supreme Court issued a brief Corrected Order, giving parties until July 6 to file briefs on
the question of the relationship between Obergefell and  the  Court’s  prior  orders  to  probate  
judges. Corrected Order, Ex parte State of Ala. ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460 (Ala.
2015), available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2015/images/06/29/al.pdf. A number of
Alabama counties have stopped issuing marriage licenses to anyone. Ross Hackman, Meet
the Alabama Judges Who Refuse to Issue Marriage Licenses – Gay or Straight, THE
GUARDIAN (July 12, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/12/alabamajudges-gay-marriage-licenses. For discussion of the current procedural and remedial
tangles over marriage equality in Alabama, see Howard M. Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama:
The Judicial Process and the Last Stand Against Marriage Equality in the Land of George
Wallace,
NW.
U.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2015),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2596633.
9
ALA. CONST. art. 1, §3.01 (amended 1998); See generally Thomas C. Berg, The
Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment: An Interpretive Guide, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 47
(2000).
10
Alabama has no state wide statutory law that protects anyone from discrimination in
employment or public accommodations. The state does have a fair housing law, ALA. CODE
§ 24-8-4 (1991), but it does not include sexual orientation or gender identity as prohibited
grounds of discrimination.
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federal RFRA, have any impact at all in this state, with its separate and
independent RFRA and its nearly blank page of relevant civil rights
statutes?
In what follows, I will appraise the legal and political salience of
Hobby Lobby, and religious freedom concerns more generally, with respect
to the development of LGBT anti-discrimination law. My overarching
thesis is that the political impact of Hobby Lobby may be much greater than
its legal impact. In the adjudicative process under federal law, I predict that
Hobby Lobby will prove to be little or no impediment to full recognition of
LGBT rights,11 where they exist. With respect to state law, that prediction is
more difficult to make with confidence, but for the reasons offered in Part
III.C., I adhere to that forecast.
In contrast, the force of Hobby Lobby in politics, especially in the short
run, may be dramatic. Many religious conservatives will continue to oppose
the expansion of LGBT rights, and will rely on principles enunciated in
Hobby Lobby to demand broad exemptions from any new obligations of
non-discrimination law. The First Amendment Defense Act, 12 recently
proposed in Congress, is a prime example. Those who favor LGBT rights
will offer their own account of the Hobby Lobby principle as a reason to
oppose any such exemptions, even very narrow ones. Hobby Lobby may
thus be an operative political factor in a persistent stalemate with respect to
legislative change in the rights of LGBT people to be free of discrimination.
Parts I and II both focus on federal law, where Hobby Lobby’s  impact  
will be most immediate and direct. Part I first sketches LGBT rights under
federal constitutional law, including the case of Rowan County Clerk Kim
Davis. Part I then analyzes potential conflicts between RFRA and other
parts of federal statutory law and regulation. Part II focuses on the ways in
which Obergefell and Hobby Lobby are likely to color the conversation,
legal and political, about expanding federal law protections against
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity – for leading
example, in the newly proposed Equality Act. 13 Part II introduces a
11

For an earlier, briefer iteration of this prediction, see Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and
the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 36, 93-100
(2015).
12
H.R. 2802, 114th Congress (2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/house-bill/2802. I discuss the Act in Part II, B, infra (text at notes 115123).
13
On July 23, 2015, U.S. Senators Baldwin, Booker, and Merkley introduced The
Equality Act, S. 1858, 114th Cong. See Historic, Comprehensive LGBT NonDiscrimination Legislation Introduced in Congress¸ MERKLEY.SENATE.GOV (July 23,
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distinction between broad, generic protections of religious freedom, such as
RFRA, and explicit, context-specific accommodations, such as the right of
religious entities to prefer co-religionists in employment, or wedding
vendors to refuse to serve same sex couples. This distinction is crucial to
the conversation about religious accommodation in Parts II and III.
Part III is devoted to developments under state law, where the
geographical disconnect between religious freedom principles and statutory
LGBT rights is significant. Where state-based rights of religious freedom
appear to be strong, statutory LGBT rights are frequently weak or nonexistent; where statutory LGBT rights are strongest, religious exemption
rights do not exist or in any event are highly unlikely to trump antidiscrimination law. Now that marriage equality has become nationwide and
constitutionally mandated, these geographical disparities will become
increasingly significant.
Part III-A describes current legal circumstances, including the ongoing
cases of vendors who refuse to serve same sex weddings, in light of this
disconnect. Part III-B analyzes recent and anticipated legislative fights,
including those involving religious charities, and the role that Hobby Lobby
has played and continues to play in legislative discourse. Part III-C focuses
on the adjudicative battles that lie ahead between LGBT rights and religious
freedom, and the significance of Hobby Lobby for those contests.
I. LGBT ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RIGHTS IN FEDERAL LAW
The non-discrimination rights in federal law for LGBT people arise
from the U.S. Constitution, Acts of Congress, and actions by the Executive
Branch. Judicial and administrative interpretations of all those sources play
a major role. Let’s  start  at  the  top.
The U.S. Constitution. Thus far, the primary source of LGBT rights in
federal law is the U.S. Constitution. As construed and applied in Romer v.

2015),
http://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/historic-comprehensive-lgbtnon-discrimination-legislation-introduced-in-congress. In the section by section summary,
the   Act’s   sponsors   describe   its   purposes   as   “Ending   Discrimination   against   LGBT  
Americans in Public Accommodations, Education, Federal Financial Assistance,
Employment,  Housing,  Credit,  and  Federal  Jury  Service.”  SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY ET AL.,
SECTION BY SECTION SUMMARY OF THE EQUALITY ACT (2015), available at
http://www.merkley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EqualityAct_SectionBySection.pdf.
The
full text of the proposed Act is available at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/EqualityAct.pdf.
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Evans, 14 Lawrence v. Texas, 15 U.S. v. Windsor, 16 and Obergefell v.
Hodges,17 the 5th and 14th Amendments have become significant sources of
protection for freedom of intimate association and civil equality – most
recently, marriage equality – for members of the LGBT community. Indeed,
the startlingly rapid movement to marriage equality drives a great deal of
the conversation about wider expansion of LGBT rights. The relevant
federal constitutional protections are rights only against the government and
its agents, and do not apply to private actors, such as for-profit businesses
and religious entities. Nevertheless, marriage equality creates an immediate
occasion for wider recognition of equality whenever marital status is linked
to rights against private parties.
In the context of this Symposium, two additional points are worth
highlighting about the protections of the federal constitution. First, although
the Supreme Court has never formally elevated the standard of review in
Fifth18 or Fourteenth19 Amendment cases involving sexual orientation, it is
hard to imagine a federal court upholding any state policy that explicitly
discriminates based on sexual orientation.20 I suspect that there are few such
laws or explicit policies remaining in any jurisdiction in the U.S.21 This is
14

517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
16
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013).
17
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
18
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
19
See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602-04; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Romer, 517 U.S.
at 636.
20
As others have noted, marriage laws discriminated de jure based on the sex of a
partner, and only de facto based on sexual orientation. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, THE
CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT
(1996); see also Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men
is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994). Professor Koppelman was among the
first to press this line of argument in gay rights law in his note, The Miscegenation
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988).
21
State laws on assisted reproductive technology may still be based on an exclusive
model of different sex couples, but that model will not survive. See DMT v. TMH, 129
So.3d 320 (Fla. 2013) (striking down exclusion of same sex couple from coverage of such
a law). Similar problems have arisen under statutory presumptions concerning parenthood,
and have been similarly resolved in favor of same sex couples. See Gartner v. Iowa Dept.
of Pub. Health, 830 N.W. 3d 335 (Iowa 2013) (holding that Iowa statute regarding
presumption of parentage for non-birthing parent must be extended to non-birthing lesbian
mother). Professor NeJaime has been writing at the cutting edge of these developments.
See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2630748 (arguing that parental rights should flow from intent and function, rather than
15
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not to say that discrimination by state actors on the basis of sexual
orientation is a thing of the past. Rather, I am asserting that no court would
find any constitutionally legitimate basis for any formal policy of exclusion,
based on sexual orientation, from state created opportunities. Whether the
policy is based on prejudice, animus,22 or sincere religious belief, it rests on
reasons that the state is forbidden to pursue. Governmental policies driven
by prejudice or animosity violate the Equal Protection Clause, 23 and
governmental policies that rest exclusively on religious propositions violate
the Establishment Clause.24
Second, whatever the possible role of religious liberty as a counterforce
to LGBT equality in the private sector, to be discussed below, the individual
religious liberty of public officials cannot provide a mandatory counterforce
to their legal duties. The litigation involving Rowan County (KY) Clerk
Kim Davis25 represents the most prominent illustration of this proposition.
Soon   after   the   Supreme   Court’s   decision   in   Obergefell, Ms. Davis
announced that her office would no longer issue marriage licenses to any
couple, same sex or otherwise.26 In an attempt to justify this policy, Ms.
Davis relied on her Apostolic Christian belief that marriage was limited to a
union of a man and a woman. 27 Two same-sex and two opposite-sex
couples sued Ms. Davis in her individual and official capacity. All members
of the four couples were residents of Rowan County, and they asserted that
the refusal of Ms. Davis to permit her office to issue marriage licenses
violated   the   plaintiffs’   rights   under   the   14th Amendment, as construed in
Obergefell.28
from biology); Douglas NeJaime, Griswold’s  Progeny,  Assisted  Reproduction, Procreative
Liberty, and Sexual Orientation Equality, 124 YALE L.J. F. 340 (2015),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/griswolds-progeny.
22
For an astute account of the role of animus in the enactment of the federal Defense
of Marriage Act, see Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus,
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183 (2013).
23
Romer, 517 U.S. at 631; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (involving equal protection component of
the  Fifth  Amendment’s  Due  Process  Clause).
24
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
25
Miller v. Davis, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105822 (E.D. KY, Aug. 12, 2015) (granting
preliminary   injunction,   requiring   County   Clerk’s   Office   to   remain   open   for   granting  
marriage licenses to legally eligible couples).
26
Id. at 2.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 16-17.
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U.S. District Court Judge Bunning agreed entirely with the plaintiffs,
and granted them preliminary injunctive relief.29 His opinion identifies the
sources  of  Clerk  Davis’  duties  to  the  plaintiffs  as  the  14th Amendment, state
law specifications of the duties of the County Clerk with respect to marriage
licenses,  and  Kentucky  Governor  Steve  Beshear’s  order  to  County  Clerks  to  
comply fully with the result in Obergefell. Judge Bunning completely
rejected   Davis’   assertion that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment empowers her to follow her religious beliefs and close her
office to couples seeking to marry. As Judge Bunning noted, the Free
Exercise Clause does not protect persons, as individuals or as public
employees, against generally applicable rules that incidentally burden
religious exercise.30 All of the legal norms to which Ms. Davis is subject –
the  federal  Constitution,  relevant  state  statutes,  and  the  Governor’s  Order  –
are generally applicable; they do not target religious objectors in any way.31
Accordingly, the Free Exercise Clause does not entitle her to any
accommodation from her legal duties, and certainly does not authorize the
closing of her office to marriage license applicants.
When Ms. Davis refused to comply with the injunction, Judge Bunning
held her in contempt and ordered her jailed until she agreed to not impede
her deputies in the discharge of their duties to couples seeking marriage
licenses.32 Even after Ms. Davis was released from jail, she defaced license

29

Id. at 42.
Id. at 24-25 (citing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
31
Id. at 27-31.   Judge   Bunning   also   rejected   Ms.   Davis’   argument   that   the   plaintiffs’  
rights were not violated because they could obtain a license to marry in another County. He
reasoned that there was no guarantee that all other County Clerks would comply with
Obergefell, and in any event plaintiffs should not be burdened with the expense and
inconvenience of having to travel to obtain something to which county residents have a
legal right. Id. at 17-18.  Judge  Bunning  also  rejected  Davis’  other  defenses,  based  on U.S.
CONST., Art.   VI,   cl.   3   (barring   “religious   Tests”   for   federal   office),   id. at 36-38, and
Kentucky RFRA, id. at 38-41. The prohibition on religious tests is inapt to the case of Ms.
Davis, because the state and county are not basing qualifications for office on religious
beliefs;;   the   government’s   only   concern   is   that   the   County   Clerk   carry   out   her   official  
duties, or at least not impede others in her office from carrying out those duties. Kentucky
RFRA, whatever it may require as an accommodation for Ms. Davis, cannot trump the
state’s   and   county’s   federal   constitutional   duties.   U.S.   CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (making the
U.S.  Constitution  and  other  federal  laws  the  “supreme  Law  of  the  Land.”)
32
Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail over Deal on SameSex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kimdavis-same-sex-marriage.html.
30
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forms in order to remove her name and the name of her office from them.33
Although her office has now resumed the issuance of marriage licenses,
legal and cultural controversy continues to swirl around Ms. Davis.34
Under some circumstances, state law may permit (or even require)
religious accommodation of public employees, so long as the
accommodation is fully respectful of the rights and interests of others. Ms.
Davis, however, was not seeking a narrow accommodation for herself, with
full scope for official recognition of same-sex marriage. Rather, she was
trying to close her office to such marriages, and she was asserting a
religious justification for that complete closure. However attractive Ms.
Davis may be as a political martyr to those who continue to oppose same
sex marriage on religious grounds, her legal position is entirely
indefensible. Government itself may not assert a religious identity,35 and so
is constitutionally barred from relying on religious beliefs in defending any
policy of discrimination. Moreover, officers and employees of government
are subject to duties to provide equal respect to all citizens, regardless of

33

For  a  careful  report  of  Ms.  Davis’  attempts  to  interfere  with  the  marriage  licensing  
function of her Office, see Marty Lederman, Don’t  be  surprised  if  Kim  Davis  is  remanded  
to the custody of the federal marshal – again, BALKIN.BLOGSPOT.COM (Sept. 19, 2015),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/09/dont-be-surprised-if-kim-davis-is.html. An additional
motion,  designed  to  limit  Ms.  Davis’  ability  to  deface  or  alter  the  licensing  forms,  is  now  
pending in front of Judge Bunning. The motion is available at Motion to Enforce
September 3 and September 8 Orders, JUSTSECURITY.ORG, https://www.justsecurity.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/09/miller.plaintiffs.motion.enforce.orders.pdf (last visited Oct.
28, 2015).
34
See, e.g., Brandon Ambrosino, The Shady Group That Played Pope Francis, THE
DAILY BEAST (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/10/05/the-shadygroup-that-played-pope-francis.html (analyzing the role of Liberty Counsel in arranging for
and publicizing the interaction between Pope Francis and Kim Davis).
35
This is a core command of the First   Amendment’s   Establishment   Clause. For full
explication of this concept, see IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR
GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 26-29, 160-63 (2014).
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sexual orientation or gender identity.36 Ms. Davis acted in defiance of all
relevant legal norms.37
The extreme and indefensible legal position of Kim Davis should not
blind us to the possibility of softer accommodations for religiously
objecting employees. In the wake of Obergefell, Attorney General Ken
Paxton   of   Texas   issued   a   formal   opinion   concerning   the   “[r]ights   of  
government officials involved with issuing same-sex marriage licenses and
conducting same-sex   wedding   ceremonies.”38 Relying on state and federal
law, the Attorney   General   concluded   that   “county clerks and their
employees retain religious freedoms that may provide for certain
accommodations of their religious objections to issuing same-sex
marriage licenses--or issuing licenses at all, but the strength of any
particular	
  accommodation	
  claim	
  depends	
  upon	
  the	
  facts.”39
Insofar as the Attorney General is relying on the federal Free Exercise
Clause, federal RFRA, or federal employment law, his conclusion is
completely unwarranted. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
confers no rights on state or local officials to resist or be exempt from those
generally applicable legal duties.40 If probate court judges, county clerks, or
other state officials object to cooperating in same sex marriages, the federal
36

For a full explication of this proposition in light of Obergefell, see Memorandum
from Public/Rights Private Conscience Project (Columbia University School of Law) to
Interested Parties (June 30, 2015), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/marriage_exemptions_memo_june_30.pdf.
An important post-Obergefell application of this principle in the context of judicial ethics
appears in Supreme Court of Ohio, Judicial Performance of Civil Marriages by Same Sex
Couples, EQUALITY CASE FILES (Aug. 7, 2015), http://files.eqcf.org/cases/ohio-supremecourt-advisory-on-performance-of-civil-marriages/.
37
Ms. Davis can be defended only by a claim that Obergefell is an illegitimate
usurpation of judicial power that should be resisted by public officials. See, e.g., Statement
Calling for Constitutional Resistance to Obergefell v. Hodges, AMERICAN PRINCIPLES
PROJECT (Oct. 8, 2015), https://americanprinciplesproject.org/founding-principles/
statement-calling-for-constitutional-resistance-to-obergefell-v-hodges%E2%80%AF/.
38
Memorandum from Attorney General Ken Paxton to Governor Dan Patrick (June
28, 2015), available at https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/
op/2015/kp0025.pdf [hereinafter Paxton Opinion]. For a briefer opinion to similar effect,
see Memorandum from Thomas Enright, Executive Counsel to Office of [Louisiana]
Governor Bobby Jindal (June 29, 2015), available at http://gov.louisiana.gov/
index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=5012.
39
Paxton Opinion, supra note 38, at 4. The opinion reached a similar conclusion with
respect to judges who have authority to conduct marriage ceremonies, but added the
important legal proposition that judges (unlike clerks) have no statutory duty to conduct
such ceremonies for anyone. Id. at 5.
40
Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892 (1990).
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Constitution cannot help them. Nor can federal RFRA, which does not
apply to the duties imposed by state and local government, and which in
any event cannot trump federal constitutional norms. Moreover, state law
cannot supersede any protection of LGBT equality imposed by federal law,
especially federal constitutional law.41
Only with respect to the possibility of a discretionary accommodation
under Texas RFRA does Attorney   General   Paxton’s   opinion rest on
plausible grounds. Texas may choose to accommodate public employees
whose religious convictions are in conflict with their official duties. For
example, public employees may be given days or hours off from work in
order to observe religious holidays. All such accommodations are
permissive rather than constitutionally mandatory, however, and are strictly
bounded by federal constitutional concerns. Under the Establishment
Clause, any such permissive accommodation must not inflict significant
harm on third parties, 42 and must in any event fully respect the
constitutional right recognized in Obergefell – that   is   the   “right   under   the  
Fourteenth Amendment for same sex couples to be married on the same
terms   as   accorded   to   couples   of   the   opposite   sex.” 43 Accordingly, the
constitutional permissibility of any accommodation of objecting employees
will turn on whether the accommodation can be executed without material
or dignitary harm to same sex couples.44 Any such accommodation must be
designed to avoid insult or discriminatory delay in the processing of
licenses. An attempt to accommodate public employees, in Texas or
elsewhere,  that  does  not  respect  this  “no  harm” principle is constitutionally
doomed.
Federal statutory law. At present, federal statutory law contains very
few explicit prohibitions on discrimination based on sexual orientation or
gender identity. Recent federal legislative proposals would, if successful,
41

This is the command of the Supremacy Clause in U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 708-09 (1985); see generally Lupu
& Tuttle, supra note 35, at 216-247.
43
Paxton Opinion, supra note 38, at 2. Similar language appears in Obergefell, 135
S.Ct.  at  2605  (“[T]he  State  laws  challenged  .  .  .  in  these  cases  are  now  held  invalid  to the
extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and
conditions as opposite-sex  couples.”)  (emphasis  added).
44
For example, recent Utah legislation (discussed further in Part III infra)
accommodates the religious freedom of individual public employees while guaranteeing
equal access for all to public offices and officials who deal with marriage. S.B. 297, 61 st
Leg. Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2015/bills/static/
SB0297.html.
42
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radically change that state of affairs, 45 but enactment of any of these
proposals is unlikely in the current, Republican-dominated Congress. As of
this writing, the Violence Against Women Act is the only federal statute
that explicitly forbids discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity.46
For now, the relevant conflicts between federal statutory rights47 and
religious freedom arise from the repeal or disappearance of federal laws that
mandated discrimination against members of the LGBT community. I refer
principally  to  the  repeal  of  “Don’t  Ask,  Don’t  Tell,”48 which has ended the
exclusion from the Armed Forces of those who are openly gay or lesbian,
and the invalidation in U.S. v. Windsor of Section 3 of the federal Defense
of Marriage Act, which excluded valid same sex marriages from all federal
recognition. The elimination of these barriers to federally created
opportunities has invited new possibilities for religious freedom objections
to obligations under federal law.
1. Integration of the Armed Forces. The repeal   of   “Don’t   Ask,   Don’t  
Tell”   has led to the open integration of the Armed Forces with respect to
sexual orientation. That change has produced conflict with assertions of
45

See supra note 13 and accompanying text. As discussed in Part II.B. infra, serious
consideration of these proposals would invite a variety of counter-proposed religious
exemptions.
46
Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (b)(13)(A) (2012). In addition, the
Mathew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. §
249, makes it a federal crime to commit an act of physical violence that is motivated by,
among other characteristics, the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of
the victim.
47
Other, non-statutory sources of federal law currently include LGBT antidiscrimination provisions. See infra notes 121-125 and accompanying text. In addition,
federal regulations in specified contexts extend antidiscrimination norms to LGBT persons.
See, e.g. George Gonzalez, HUD Issues Guidance on Multifamily Assisted and Insured
Housing based on Equal Access to Housing Rule, HUD.GOV (July 13, 2015),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2015/H
UDNo_15-086.
48
See Don’t  Ask,  Don’t  Tell  Repeal  Act  of  2010,  Pub.  L.  No.  111-321 (repealing 10
U.S.C. § 654). Discrimination against transgendered persons in the armed forces continued
after the repeal. See Juliet Eilperin, Transgender in the Military: A Pentagon in Transition
Weighs its Policy, WASHINGTON POST (April 9, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/transgender-in-the-military-a-pentagon-in-transition-weighs-its-policy/2015/04/09/
ee0ca39e-cf0d-11e4-8c54-ffb5ba6f2f69_story.html?postshare=9481428673479708.
The
Armed Forces are now changing their policies. See Sandhya Somashekhar and Craig
Whitlock, Military to Allow Transgender Members to Serve Openly, WASHINGTON POST
(July 16, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pentagon-to-allow-transgendermembers-to-serve-openly/2015/07/13/fe9b054a-298d-11e5-a5ea-cf74396e59ec_story.html.
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religious liberty by some chaplains, who have objected to officiating at
same sex weddings, counseling same sex spouses or partners within the
military, and counseling LGBT servicemen and servicewomen on matters
related to their sexual identities.49 As Professor Tuttle and I have explained
elsewhere, military chaplains have a dual role.50 They are endorsed by their
particular faith community as ordained or approved clergy, and in that
capacity they preside over worship services and sacraments within their
faith. When acting in that role, chaplains may follow the dictates of their
faith when deciding how to worship, and who is entitled to particular
sacraments. Accordingly, a chaplain may refuse to perform any marriage
ceremony, including one involving a same sex couple, if that ceremony is
not  consistent  with  the  chaplain’s  faith.
Military chaplains, however, have a distinct role as officers responsible
for the spiritual welfare of all service members in their units.51 In that role,
chaplains are obliged to provide counsel and direction – either themselves
or by appropriate referral to others -- to members of every faith. This is an
essential  part  of  the  chaplain’s  official  mission,  necessary  to  guarantee  that
all who serve in the Armed Forces have equal and sufficient access to
spiritual resources.52 Accordingly, chaplains are obliged to counsel openly
gay and lesbian members of the Armed Forces, even with respect to matters
that touch on same-sex intimacy. 53 Allowing exemptions to objecting
49

The most prominent controversy in this regard has involved Navy Lt. Cmdr. Wesley
Modder,   who   faces   discipline   by   the   U.S.   Navy   “for allegedly scolding sailors for
homosexuality   and   premarital   sex.” See Andrew Tighman, Chaplain Faces Possible
Discharge   for   Being   ‘Intolerant’, MILITARY TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015),
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/03/10/chaplain-fired/24699275. Some
Members of Congress have proposed a Military Religious Freedom Protection Act,
designed to protect military chaplains and others against being required to cooperate with
or assist LGBT members of the Armed Forces. H.R. 914, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/914. Congress did not enact the
proposal. See Howard Friedman, President Objects to House Passed LGBT Related
Provisions, RELIGION CLAUSE (May 24, 2012, 7:05 AM), http://religionclause.blogspot.
com/2012/05/president-objects-to-house-passed.html.
50
LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 35, at 251-262; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W. VA.
L. REV. 89, 132 (2007).
51
Id. at 119.
52
Id.
53
If a chaplain offered marital or couples counseling limited to members of her faith
community, this would justify exclusion of all couples, same sex or otherwise, from outside
that community. But if the couples counseling were not so restricted, exclusion of same sex
couples would be discrimination, pure and simple, based on sexual orientation.
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chaplains from such an obligation would undercut the government’s  interest  
in providing equal access to spiritual resources, especially if other chaplains
were unavailable.
A chaplain’s   assertion   of   rights   under   federal   RFRA   should not alter
this outcome.   First,   it   may   not   be   a   “substantial   burden”   on   a   chaplain’s  
religious exercise to compel him to counsel all who seek help. Outside the
role of chaplain in a public institution, ordained clergy are of course free to
minister or refuse to minister as they choose. Within such institutions,
however, the dictates of the role require service to all, and the claim that
such service is a religious burden seems quite inconsistent with the
chaplain’s   commission,   voluntarily   accepted. Even if, arguendo, the
obligation to counsel all is religiously   burdensome,   the   government’s  
refusal to provide a RFRA exemption to a complaining chaplain should be
upheld  under  RFRA’s  terms. The government has a very strong interest in
providing equal and adequate resources to all who serve. In some situations,
the government may have an alternative chaplain available, but that will not
always be the case – a particular ship or base may have very few chaplains
for all who serve there. And even if alternatives are available, the refusal by
a chaplain to serve a particular member of the Armed Forces may inflict
indignities that the government has a strong interest in preventing.
To put the matter differently -- chaplains acting in their role as spiritual
advisers to all within their zone of responsibility are officers of the United
States. The   equal   protection   component   of   the   Fifth   Amendment’s   Due  
Process Clause54 mandates that chaplains treat all Members of the Armed
Forces with equal respect, and prohibits invidious discrimination against
any of them. That chaplains are also ordained clergy, with a separate and
distinct role with respect to those in their own faith community, does not
insulate chaplains from the dictates of the Constitution.
2. Federal recognition of same sex marriages. Prior to Windsor,
section 3 of DOMA excluded same sex married couples from federal rights,
benefits, and obligations triggered by marital status. Windsor invalidated
that statutory exclusion.
The erasure of DOMA’s   effect   has   catapulted   federally   mandated  
rights for same sex married couples into the private sector. For prominent
example, the Family and Medical Leave Act (hereafter   “FMLA”)   requires
54

U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct 2679, 2693 (2013) (holding the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment requires invalidation of DOMA, section 3). For an earlier iteration of the
concept   of   an   “equal   protection   component”   to   the   Fifth   Amendment,   see Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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covered private employers to make available a period of unpaid leave for
employees whose spouse, child, or parent has a serious medical problem.55
In February of 2015, in light of Windsor, the U.S. Department of Labor
announced a rule that amends the definition of spouse so that eligible
employees in same-sex marriages are now eligible to take FMLA leave to
care for a spouse.56
Suppose a private employer asserts a RFRA objection to extending
such a leave, related to a spousal illness, to an employee in a valid same-sex
marriage. The employer does not want to fire this employee because of his
or her sexual orientation, but objects to being compelled by federal law to
recognize the marriage as valid. At a superficial glance, the structure of this
claim seems similar to that advanced in Hobby Lobby – a business
enterprise would be making a religious objection to being implicated, by
granting a leave of absence with a right to return to the position, in
recognition of a relationship that the employer views as religiously
unacceptable, both in its sexual component and in its claim to full respect as
a marriage.57
55

FMLA covers private sector employers who employ fifty or more employees for at
least 20 workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i)
(2012). Another federal statutory context in which similar issues about recognition of same
sex marriages may appear is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which
includes protections for surviving spouses of persons with private pension plans. See 29
U.S.C.§ 1055 (a)(2) (2012).
56
Federal Job-Protected Family and Medical Leave Rights Extended to Eligible
Workers in Same-Sex Marriages, DOL.GOV (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/
opa/media/press/whd/WHD20150285.htm. The Rule itself is 29 C.F.R. § 825.102 (2015).
57
There is nothing far-fetched about this hypothetical. For example, when Illinois
legislated the validity of same sex marriage, a number of religious liberty advocates
proposed legislative provisions that would permit objecting employers to refuse to
recognize same sex marriages as valid for purposes of the employment relationship. See
Letter from Thomas C. Berg, et al., to Representative Christopher Donovan (Apr. 20,
2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/letter-to-rep.-donovan-re-bill-89904-20-09.pdf (citing letter to Illinois lawmakers and other, similar letters to lawmakers in
other states). For an exposition of the views opposing such provisions in the Illinois
legislation, see Dale Carpenter, et al., Religious Liberty and Marriage for Same-Sex
Couples, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/
files/five-law-professors-against-changing-sb-10.pdf (containing letter from legal scholars,
myself included, responding to the arguments made by the proponents of these provisions).
In its law ending discrimination in marriage against same sex couples, the Illinois
legislature did not enact any exemptions for commercial businesses in their employment or
customer service obligations. Id. In the spring of 2015, the Louisiana legislature considered
a Bill that contained such religion-based exemptions. See H.B. 707, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(La. 2015), available at http://media.nola.com/politics/other/Religious%20Freedom%
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Although  the  Court’s  opinion  in  Hobby Lobby appears to have left such
questions open, I think it highly unlikely that the employer would prevail.
The arguments in such a dispute are worth unpacking in detail, because they
will track many of the arguments in any comparable case in which RFRAbased rights (federal or state) are advanced against the protections of
employment law. The arguments are likely to fall into the categories of 1)
the employer-objector’s   religious   sincerity;;   2)   whether   the   FMLA  
obligation imposes a substantial burden on the employer-objector’s  
religious  exercise;;  3)  the  weight  of  the  government’s  interest  in  denying  an  
exemption to FMLA to the employer-objector; and 4) whether the
government has alternative ways to satisfy its interest in the employee
obtaining the relevant benefits under FMLA. Let’s  consider  these,  one-byone, in the terms in which they are likely to be contested.
Religious sincerity. This is a potential threshold question in every
religious exemption case. Like the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA protects
only sincere religious beliefs,58 not other kinds of beliefs, sincere or not,
masquerading as religious. In our hypothetical FMLA dispute, the employer
will offer whatever evidence may be available to him on this question – for
example, membership in a church that teaches the sinfulness of same sex
intimacy, and/or consistent and demonstrated adherence by the employer to
that principle. The employee may challenge the veracity or credibility of
that evidence. The employee may also offer evidence of inconsistent
statements  or  conduct,   including  perhaps  the   employer’s   social acceptance
of the   employee’s spousal relationship (for example, by invitation of the
spouse to an office holiday party).
Not so long ago, a claim that opposition to same sex marriage was
religiously sincere would have been met with a completely non-skeptical
response, by courts or otherwise. At a moment of great social change and
cultural agitation on issues of same sex intimacy, including ferment within
many religious communities, we may be entering a period of increased
skepticism about whether any particular employer – especially a secular,
commercial, for-profit employer – is acting out of sincere religious
20bill%20(1).pdf (original version). I discuss the Louisiana proposal, which was not
enacted, in Part III.B., infra.
58
U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (finding Free Exercise Clause protects
only sincere religious belief, and juries may appraise sincerity when relevant). The
sincerity requirement applies similarly in generic statutory protections of religious liberty.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774, n. 28 (stating that RFRA requires sincere religious
belief); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (stating that protection under RLUIPA
requires sincere religious belief).
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conviction, or reflexive, homophobic bigotry. This will rarely be an easy
question, though the evidence may push one way or the other – for example,
does the employer treat LGBT employees with personal respect, or is he
tolerant of nasty and disrespectful slurs? Tolerance of hateful treatment
suggests bigoted animus, not religious disapproval.
Over time, I suspect that employees, administrative agencies, and
reviewing courts in this sort of situation may become increasingly
disinclined   to   accept   the   employer’s   word   on   the   question   of   religious  
sincerity. Needless to say, putting this issue in dispute may be personal and
ugly, and yet simultaneously necessary to weed out non-meritorious claims
at the threshold. Moreover, this sort of inquiry incentivizes respectful
treatment of all employees. An employer who wants respect for his
religious convictions about sexual orientation would be wise to police
derogatory name-calling and harassment of LGBT employees in the
workplace. As religious opposition to same-sex intimacy wanes over time
and space, decision-makers might appropriately adopt a rebuttable
presumption that anti-gay attitudes are not religiously sincere.59
Substantial burden. The trigger for federal RFRA (and most or all state
RFRAs)  is  a  showing  that  the  RFRA  claimant’s  religious  exercise  has  been  
substantially burdened. What would the asserted burden be in our
hypothetical FMLA dispute? I would expect the objecting employer to
argue that the obligation to grant a leave, even without pay, to the employee
to care for his same sex spouse represents a recognition of  the  employee’s  
marital status, to which the employer has a religious objection.
Does Hobby Lobby foreclose a judicial interrogation of that claim of
burden? The employer in Hobby Lobby objected to inclusion of certain
contraceptives in the employer-provided health insurance plan, on the
grounds that the inclusion made the employer complicit in the use of those
contraceptives. 60 However attenuated that seems to some, 61 the Court

59

A comparable skepticism attached almost immediately to claims that religious
principles animated policies of racial exclusion in public accommodation. See generally
James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal
Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 99, 105-110 (2015). The leading decision, summarily rejecting a claim of
religious exemption from public accommodation laws in matters of race, is Newman v.
Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968).
60
For analysis of the increasingly broad role of complicity claims in the jurisprudence
of religious freedom, see Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars:
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2202 (2015).
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concluded that it could not second-guess  the  employer’s  assertion  that  this  
kind  of  complicity  violated  the  employer’s  religious  conscience. That claim
of complicity seems similar, though not identical, to the claim of a baker or
photographer to refrain from providing goods or services to a same sex
wedding – that is to say, to facilitating a particular practice.
In contrast, a RFRA objection to a leave to care for a spouse is not
aimed at a particular practice. Rather, the objection is broader and far more
troubling, because its target is a relationship, an ongoing status protected in
many ways by law. If the employer, acting on religious grounds, can treat a
marriage as invalid, the employer can presumptively exclude the spouse
from all benefits that federal law requires private employers to provide to
employees’  spouses – for example, notifications or pension benefits under a
private, ERISA-regulated pension plan.62
It is difficult to see how this kind of claim of a religious burden could
be limited to same sex marriages. Why would it not also extend to other
marriages to which the employer had religious objection (e.g., inter-racial,
inter-faith, purely secular), or to parent-child relationships to which the
employer had religious objections (e.g., a child born out of wedlock, or
through some form of assisted reproduction)? An employer might assert
that any of these relationships are unnatural, disordered, contrary  to  God’s  
plan, or evil.63 These kinds of objections, to status rather than acts, extend
far beyond any singular act of ‘sinful”  behavior, and are sweepingly hostile
to the life plans of those whose family connections are being denied.
Although objections to recognition of status are likely to have greater
legal and emotional consequences than objections to facilitation of acts, the
wholly individualized and utterly subjective character of religious
conscience, as validated in Hobby Lobby,64 makes it logically impossible (at
61

See Abner Greene, Religious Freedom and (other) Civil Liberties: Is There a Middle
Ground, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 185 (2015)   (arguing   that   burden   on   employer’s  
religious exercise was too attenuated to be substantial within the meaning of RFRA).
62
See supra note 55.
63
See Heather Knight, Archbishop Salvatore   Cordileone   Spells   Out   Schools’   Sex  
Doctrine, SFGATE (Feb. 3, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/SFarchbishop-clarifies-sexual-doctrine-for-high-6060293.php.
64
134 S. Ct. at 2777-2779 (citing Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana, 450 U.S. 707,
715 (1981)) (concluding that in Free Exercise Clause cases, courts may not second-guess
the   accuracy,   consistency,   or   credibility   of   the   claimants’   religious   beliefs).   Professor  
Tuttle and I have argued that Thomas is correct in concluding that government officials are
constitutionally incompetent to appraise the religious significance of a practice. See LUPU
& TUTTLE, supra note 35, at 226-32. We see this disability, however, as a reason to be
deeply skeptical of RFRA as a matter of policy, and to construe it narrowly when (in a case

2015]

Moving Targets

19

the  “burden”  phase) to distinguish between acts and status.65 Unfortunately,
this means that all religious objections to a legal obligation to act
supportively toward same sex marriage will trigger the demanding tests of
“compelling  governmental  interest”  and  “least  restrictive  means.”
Compelling interest in denying the exemption. Suppose that, for the
reasons just advanced, a court finds that compliance with FMLA with
respect  to  a  same  sex  spouse  substantially  burdens  an  employer’s  religious
exercise. That   doesn’t   end   the   case,   but   it   does   immediately place
formidable obstacles in the legal path of opponents of the RFRA claim.
What   is   the   quality   and   weight   of   the   government’s   interest   in   denying   a
RFRA exemption to the FMLA?
The question is more complex than it first appears. The most
straightforward answer averts to the policies that led to enactment of the
FMLA – that is, to protect employees from adverse job consequences that
arise from their own medical needs, or (as in our hypothetical case) the
medical needs of close family members. Some of these needs may be
voluntary, such as those arising from a wanted pregnancy, but most are not
– they involve some form of illness or injury to a family member, and the
corresponding pressure on an employee to take time off from work to care
for that family member. The government interests here include work-family
balance, economic security, and integrity of families. 66 The government
like Hobby Lobby) it otherwise will do harm. See id. at 237-247. See also Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, Religious Questions and Saving Constructions, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18,
2015, 11:12 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-religious-questionsand-saving-constructions/.
65
Although  RFRA  claimants  get  to  define  their  own  “religious  exercise,”  courts  must  
decide whether the challenged law pressures or coerces them to alter their religious
exercise. For application of this principle in the context of the accommodation of non-profit
employers with respect to the contraceptive mandate, see Little Sisters of the Poor Home
for  the  Aged  v.  Burwell,  2015  WL  4232096  (10th  Cir.  2015);;  Geneva  Coll.  v.  Sec’y  U.S.  
Dep’t   of   Health   &   Human   Serv.,   778   F.3d   422   (3d   Cir.   2015);;   Univ.   of   Notre   Dame   v.  
Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015); East Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 2015 U.S.
App.   LEXIS   10513   (5th   Cir.   2015);;   Priests   for   Life   v.   U.S.   Dep’t   of   Health   &   Human  
Services, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh’g   en   banc   denied, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS
8326 (D.C. Cir. 2015). On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
these five cases and two others raising the same issues, and consolidated all seven cases
under the caption Zubik v. Burwell (No. 14-1418), 577 U.S. ___ (2015). For an excellent
analysis of the issues raised by these decisions, see Martin Lederman, Update on the
Contraceptive Coverage Regulations and Litigation, BALKANIZATION (July 20, 2015),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/07/update-on-contraception-coverage.html.
66
See Family & Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 2601 (b)(1) (1993) (stating purposes
of  Act  are  “to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote
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interests also include, more subtly, the social and personal value of family
care as compared to no care, or care by strangers, for someone who has
significant medical needs; gender equality; eradication of sex stereotypes
about who does the caring; and peace of mind for an employee, who would
otherwise fear losing his or her job because of family needs to stay at home
and provide care.
A RFRA exemption from FMLA for employers who object to same sex
marriages would deprive the affected employees and their families of the
benefit of up to 12 weeks per calendar year of such leave, without pay but
with the right to return to the job without loss of status or seniority. It is
crucial to note, however, that the exemption is by definition discriminatory;
the employer is not religiously objecting to marriage, or even to the
employer’s responsibility to provide a marriage-supportive benefit. Instead,
the employer is providing leaves with respect to marriages that are
religiously acceptable to him, and denying it to others.
Moreover, recognition of a RFRA exemption in a case involving a
same sex spouse invites the possibility of objection on religious grounds to
other marriages, including inter-racial and inter-faith marriages. On the
subjective, individualized religion side of the equation, there is no
distinction possible among the objections to these various partnerships. To
be   sure,   objections   based   on   a   marital   partner’s   race   or   religion   would  
violate   Title   VII’s   prohibition   on   discrimination   based   on   such  
characteristics. In such a case, the employer would be demanding a RFRA
exemption from Title VII as well as from FMLA. The addition of Title VII
concerns to FMLA concerns adds to the weight   of   the   government’s  
interests in denying a RFRA-based exemption.67
Because no widely applicable federal statute explicitly prohibits
discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation,68 employers will

the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in
preserving family integrity.”)
67
See id. at § 2601 (b)(4)-(5) (stating purposes of FMLA include promotion of equal
employment opportunity and non-discrimination). The iconic citation for the proposition
that anti-discrimination interests trump religious freedom interests is Bob Jones Univ. v.
U.S., 461 U.S. 474 (1983) (upholding revocation of non-profit tax status of a university
that prohibited inter-racial dating on campus). The Court in Hobby Lobby cited Bob Jones
University with approval. 134 S. Ct. at 2783. The government had not argued, however, as
it might have, that an exception to the contraceptive mandate was a sex discriminatory
exception, in contravention of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
68
There  is  considerable  current  controversy  concerning  whether  Title  VII’s  prohibition  
on sex discrimination should be construed to include discrimination based on sexual
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assert that the anti-discrimination interest should not count in the equation
to the same extent as if the objected-to marriage was inter-racial or interfaith. That argument, however, presupposes an overly narrow measure of
federal interests. Executive Branch action is another important source of
expression for such interests. A variety of federal policies, emanating from
the Executive Branch, against discrimination based on sexual orientation
should contribute to the appraisal of the quality of federal interests. 69
Accordingly, the anti-discrimination norm – in its focus on material harm as
well as stigmatic injury – should play an important role in the appraisal of a
RFRA objection to extending FMLA leave to an employee with a sick or
injured same sex spouse.
I recognize fully the manipulability of RFRA’s   terms, including
“compelling interests.”70 If we are to take this provision seriously, however,
the government’s arguments that it has compelling interests in denying
RFRA exemptions to the FMLA, in the case of objection to same sex
marriage, seem very strong.71
Availability of   alternative   means   of   satisfying   the   government’s  
interest. Even if a  court  views  the  government’s  interest  as compelling, the
government will not prevail unless it can show that applying the FMLA to
the employer   in   this   case   is   the   “least   restrictive   alternative”   to  
accomplishing   the   government’s   interest. In Hobby Lobby, this question
proved dispositive against the government, because it already had in place
an accommodation for non-profit religious entities. The Court did not rule
that the accommodation, which remains under RFRA challenge from
orientation or gender identity. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 81-94 and
accompanying text.
69
Exec. Order No. 13087, 63 Fed Reg. 30097 (May 28, 1998) available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/executiveorders/13087.cfm; Exec Order No. 13672, 63 Fed.
Reg. 42971 (July 21, 2015) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-0723/pdf/2014-17522.pdf (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity in federal employment and employment by federal contractors).
70
A great deal of the argument in Lupu, supra note 11, is devoted to the proposition
that  all  of  RFRA’s  terms  are  extremely  vague  and  malleable.  
71
Although the FMLA covers only employers with fifty or more employees, this
formula reflects competing interests of smaller employers, who will have more difficulty
granting leaves with a right to return, than employers with a larger work force. The formula
does   not   reflect   any   judgment   about   the   strength   or   weakness   of   employees’   interests   in  
obtaining family or medical leave. Cf. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (refusing to treat
coverage   formula   in   ACA   dispositive   of   the   “compelling   interest”   question.) For further
discussion of this important point about the relationship between under-inclusion in
coverage and the weight of government interests, see Lupu, supra note 11, at 82-86.
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religious non-profits, 72 was itself lawful as applied to all religious nonprofits. Nevertheless, a five Justice majority concluded that the
accommodation revealed the availability of an alternative that would 1)
satisfy   the   government’s   interest   in   providing   access   to   all   contraceptives  
and 2) be less restrictive of religious liberty than the mandate challenged by
Hobby Lobby and other for-profit entities.73
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s  recent decision in Holt v. Hobbs74 reinforces
the  importance  of  the  “least  restrictive  alternative”  standard  in cases brought under
general religious liberty statutes. Holt involved   a   Muslim   prison   inmate’s   claim  
under the  Religious  Land  Use  and  Institutionalized  Persons  Act  (“RLUIPA”)  that
Arkansas prison officials had forbidden him to grow a beard, in violation of his
obligations as a Muslim man. Among other issues, the Court emphasized that the
official concern that prisoners might hide contraband could be satisfied by means
far less restrictive of religious freedom than forcing the inmate to shave—for
example, requiring him to regularly run a comb through his beard at the request of
prison guards. RFRA and the RLUIPA provisions concerning institutionalized
persons are   framed   in   identical   terms   of   “substantial   burden,”   “compelling  
government   interest,”   and   “least restrictive   alternative,”   and the Holt opinion
accordingly cited the recent Hobby Lobby decision as authority for the proper
interpretation of all those terms.75
Despite  the  force  of  the  “least  restrictive  alternative”  standard  in  Hobby
Lobby and Holt, this element of RFRA will not save our employer in the
hypothetical FMLA case. The government has made no special
accommodation for other religious objectors, so the employer cannot point
to any such policy and demand its extension. Most significantly, interests
that FMLA is designed to serve–familial care for the sick or injured,
employee security with respect to keeping a job in time of emergency, and
gender equality–cannot be satisfied with any feasible alternative.
72

See, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d 606, cert. granted sub nom. Zubik v.
Burwell (No. 14-1418), 577 U.S. ___ (2015); East Texas Baptist Univ. 2015 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10513, cert. granted sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell (No. 14-1418), 577 U.S. ___
(2015); Priests for Life, 772 F.3d 229, cert. granted sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell (No. 141418), 577 U.S. ___ (2015).
73
In July 2015, the Obama Administration promulgated a Rule extending the
accommodation to closely held, for profit corporations. See Coverage of Preventive
Services under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41317 (Aug. 14, 2015). The major
substantive question involved in the Rulemaking was the criteria for which companies will
be  considered  “closely  held”  and  therefore  eligible  for  any  new  accommodation  offered  to  
firms organized for profit. Id. at 22-35.
74
Holt, 135 S.Ct. 853.
75
Id. at 859-63.
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Of course, in theory the government could always make itself the
employer of last resort for every covered employee whose employer makes
a religious objection. If and when the employer denies an otherwise
appropriate FMLA leave request, the employee would contact the
government, and it would hire him on the spot to work at the same or better
wages when the covered FMLA period expires, or when the emergency
ends, whichever is sooner. Or the government would pay the dismissed
employee his wages plus the value of lost fringe benefits until he can find a
job equivalent to the one he lost.
I suspect that the readers of this article can instantly see how ridiculous
this argument is. The government stepping in as an employer of last resort
is an alternative to imposing any and all labor standards on religiously
objecting employers, whether the objection is to family leave, minimum
wages, maximum hours, efforts to unionize, non-discrimination on the basis
of sex, religion, or other job-irrelevant characteristics, and so on. If a
guarantee of government employment for those who are unlawfully fired,
discriminated against, or treated in substandard ways counts as   a   “least  
restrictive   alternative”   under RFRA, then there will always be a relevant
option “less   restrictive”   of   religious   liberty   than   full imposition of the
relevant labor laws.76
RFRA cannot plausibly be construed this way. The predecessor free
exercise law on which RFRA was based never suggested anything so
extreme   in   application   of   the   “least   restrictive   means” test. Even if one
accepts the radical view that   RFRA   incorporates   only   the   “high-water
mark”  of  prior  free  exercise  law,77 as displayed in Sherbert v. Verner78 and
76

The best judicial expositions of this problem of regress in the evaluation of
alternatives are those of Judge Pillard in Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 264-67 and Judge
Posner in Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 616-19. Long ago, I played out the scenario of reductio
ad absurdum in  the  availability  of  “less  restrictive  means,”  through  use  of  the  Biblical  story  
of Abraham and Isaac. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 2797
Before the Subcomm. On Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. On the
Judiciary, 102 Cong. 381-83 (1992) (statement of Ira C. Lupu), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/07/13/hear-99-1992.pdf.
77
For the earliest, strongest, and best-titled presentation of the radical view, see
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code,
56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 256 (1995); see also Micah J. Schwartzman, What Did RFRA
Restore?, BERKLEY CENTER (Sept. 11, 2015), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/
cornerstone/hobby-lobby-the-ruling-and-its-implications-for-religious-freedom/responses/
what-did-rfra-restore; Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger et al., The New Law of
Religion, SLATE (July 3, 2015, 11:54 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/07/after_hobby_lobby_there_is_only_rfra_and_that_s_al
l_you_need.html.
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Wisconsin v. Yoder, 79 no Justice has ever taken the view that the
government must exhaust all available options, regardless of feasibility, for
avoiding burdens on religious liberty.
Hobby Lobby itself, though hinting that the government could itself
provide the challenged contraceptives directly to affected women, falls back
on   the   much   more   modest   proposition   that   the   government’s   own  
accommodation of nonprofits reveals the availability of a reasonable less
restrictive alternative. In a regulatory context, in which FMLA and most
labor laws reside, there are no reasonable and less restrictive alternatives.
Direct government provision of the relevant protection for employees will
almost always be non-feasible and un-administrable. Put more directly, the
government has a compelling interest in denying a RFRA exemption to
these sorts of labor regulations, because granting them will generate
significant losses to regulatory beneficiaries and government cannot
reasonably step in and replace the lost benefits.
This proposition is most obvious with respect to anti-discrimination
laws, which protect against dignitary harms as well as material ones. Even
if the government offers employment of equivalent value to an employee
denied FMLA leave to care for a same-sex spouse, the employer has
insulted  and  demeaned  the  dignity  of  that  employee’s  marriage  commitment  
and family life. No alternative the government might provide can remedy
that harm.80
II. EMERGING PROHIBITIONS AGAINST LGBT DISCRIMINATION
IN FEDERAL LAW
As noted above, federal statutory law currently includes very few
explicit prohibitions on discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity. Such prohibitions might arise in two ways. First, agencies or courts
might construe pre-existing statutes, that forbid discrimination based on sex,
78

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
80
Immediately after the Hobby Lobby decision, Professor Tuttle and I predicted that
courts would not sustain RFRA objections to anti-discrimination law, whether focused on
LGBT rights or otherwise. Robert W. Tuttle & Ira Lupu, Hobby Lobby in the Long Run,
BERKLEY CENTER (July 1, 2014), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/hobbylobby-in-the-long-run. The Hobby Lobby opinion characterized the elimination of race
discrimination in employment as a compelling interest, but conspicuously omitted mention
of any other categories of discrimination, including that based on sex or religion, as
similarly compelling. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783. I discuss this in Lupu, supra note
11, at 93-100. See also infra Part III.C.
79
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to cover LGBT discrimination. Second, Congress might enact new laws that
explicitly forbid LGBT discrimination in various contexts.
A. New Interpretations of Existing Law
On the interpretive front, the EEOC and some lower federal courts
have advanced the theory that discrimination in employment based on
LGBT status is a version of unlawful sex discrimination — that is, the
discrimination is driven by gender-based stereotypes about how men and
women should act, appear, or interact in their intimate relationships.81 In a
very recent case before the Commission, involving a federal employee, the
agency reaffirmed the position that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is a form of sex discrimination, forbidden by Title VII. 82 In the
courts, cases brought on behalf of transgender people83 have thus far fared
better than those concerning sexual orientation alone,84 although the recent
EEOC decision suggests that these questions are in considerable flux.
The notion that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of
sex discrimination has been around for over twenty years. In Baehr v.
Lewin,85 the Supreme Court of Hawaii relied on the concept in the context
of a same sex marriage case brought under the state constitution. Professor
Koppelman soon thereafter further developed this concept under the

81

Several years ago, the EEOC adopted this as an official position. See Processing
Complaints of Discrimination by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Federal
Employees, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/directives/lgbt_complaint_processing
.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). See also Terveer v. Billington, 34 F.Supp.3d 100 (D.D.C.
2014). For additional discussion, see Martin Lederman, Why the Law Does Not (and
Should Not) Allow Religiously Motivated Contractors to Discriminate Against their LGBT
Employees, CORNERSTONE BLOG (July 31, 2014), http:// berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/
cornerstone/non-discrimination-executive-order-and-religious-freedom/responses/why-thelaw-does-not-and-should-not-allow-religiously-motivated-contractors-to-discriminateagainst-their-lgbt-employees, archived at http:// perma.cc/5YRW-Z4WY.
82
Complainant vs. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641
(E.E.O.C. 2015). For immediate commentary on the ruling, see Dale Carpenter, Anti-gay
Discrimination is Sex Discrimination, Says the EEOC, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 16,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/16/anti-gaydiscrimination-is-sex-discrimination-says-the-eeoc/.
83
See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
84
See, e.g., Gilbert v. Country Music   Ass’n,   432   F.   App’x   516,   520   (6th   Cir.   2011)  
(distinguishing between sexual orientation claims and gender non-conforming claims, and
suggesting that only the latter are actionable).
85
852 P. 2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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Fourteenth Amendment’s   Equal Protection Clause, 86 as did Professor
Eskridge in his path-breaking book on same sex marriage.87
Moving from the equal protection version of this argument to the Title
VII extension of it, however, involves a leap. The Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment makes no mention of discrimination, based on race,
sex, or otherwise. The Supreme Court has construed the Clause to
presumptively forbid sex classifications, 88 because they are analogous in
important ways to racial classifications.89 Classifying based on LGBT status
is a persuasive extension of that presumptive prohibition. Like traditional
classifications distinguishing between males and females, classifications
based on sexual orientation or gender identity suffer from similar qualities
of prejudice, negative stereotyping, and caste re-affirmation,90 and bear little
or no relationship to legitimate governmental purposes. Despite these
arguments, the Court in Obergefell continued its longstanding pattern of not
addressing whether classifications based on sexual orientation should be
treated as presumptively suspect under the Equal Protection Clause.91
Even if the Court had ruled such classifications suspect in Obergefell,
however, the Title VII question of whether classifications based on sexual
orientation are forbidden by the existing prohibition on sex discrimination
would have remained open. Title VII does not track an abstract concept of
“equal   protection.” Rather, it forbids discrimination in employment based
on specific, identified characteristics, including sex. If one believes in
dynamic statutory interpretation,92 extending the concept of discrimination
based on sex to discrimination based on gender identity and sexual
orientation makes perfect sense. All are related to social constructions of
86

Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).
87
ESKRIDGE, supra note 20.
88
See, e.g., U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
89
Justice  Brennan’s  plurality  opinion  in  Frontiero  v.  Richardson,  411  U.S.  677  (1973)  
is the strongest attempt in a Supreme Court opinion to fully assimilate sex classifications
with race classifications as constitutionally suspect.
90
See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293; see generally William N. Eskridge, Original
Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2568675; Akhil Amar, Attainder and
Amendment  2:  Romer’s  Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996); Daniel Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996).
91
The discussion of equal protection in the Obergefell opinion is cursory and reveals
no effort to link up with the elaborate body of law about suspicious classifications.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623-26.
92
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
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sex and gender. All these types of discrimination involve reinforcing narrow
and frequently demeaning stereotypes of male and female roles, attempting
to impose gender-based identities on those for whom they are unsuitable,
and producing irrational limitation of employment opportunities.
If, in contrast, one asks the static interpretive question whether the
enacting Congress in 1964 contemplated that its ban on sex discrimination
would protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity, I suspect the answer might be quite different. Homophobia and
animus toward LGBT people were pervasive in the U.S. at the time.
Moreover, forbidding what we now view as conventional sex discrimination
–- employment opportunities determined heavily by whether the applicant is
male or female – was quite radical at that time. 93 The idea that the
prohibition on sex discrimination implicitly included discrimination based
on sexual orientation or gender identity would have deeply surprised the
provision’s   proponents, and might well have doomed the provision to
defeat.94
If   the   EEOC’s   current   position   on LGBT discrimination eventually
finds favor in the federal appellate courts, RFRA objections to application
of the provision will not be far behind. Companies whose owners object on
religious grounds to same sex marriage are certain to argue that their
religious exercise is burdened by any statutory requirement that they
recognize such a marriage as valid for purposes of employee benefits.
As demonstrated by the discussion in Part I of RFRA objections to
FMLA leave to care for same sex spouses, these RFRA objections should
not prevail. The   government’s   interests in preventing invidious
discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation or gender identity

93

It has been suggested that the prohibition on sex discrimination originally appeared
in Title VII as a poison pill, designed to attract votes against the Bill. See Cary Franklin,
Inventing the Traditional Concept of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1318 n.
36 (2012) (citing prominent sources). Professor Franklin disputes this account. See id. at
1317-1329.
94
The leading academic proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which
would have amended the Constitution to forbid governmental classifications based on sex,
wrote a lengthy and now iconic piece about the scope and meaning of the proposed
amendment without ever mentioning discrimination based on sexual orientation. Barbara
Brown, et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for
Women, 80 YALE L.J. 872 (1971). ERA advocates publicly disclaimed any connection
between the proposed amendment and same sex marriage or intimacy. Douglas NeJaime,
Before Marriage: The Unexplained History of Nonmarital Recognition and its Relationship
to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87, 98-99 & n. 48-49 (2014).
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are very strong, 95 and the government has available no alternative less
restrictive of religious liberty for protecting these interests. The
government’s   argument   is   still more powerful if this conflict between
RFRA and Title VII arises from an interpretation that a ban on
discrimination against those with same sex spouses is included in Title
VII’s  prohibition on sex discrimination. In such circumstances, sustaining a
RFRA objection would open the doors to successful RFRA objections in
cases of more traditional sex discrimination in employment.96
Moreover, if courts do interpret Title VII as currently framed to include
discrimination based on sexual orientation, the question will remain
whether the right of religious organizations to prefer co-religionists in
hiring will permit the exclusion of openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual
employees, on the grounds that the organization has religious objection to
same sex intimacy. The following section of this paper discusses the
considerations of law and policy that will eventually come to bear on that
question.
B. Proposed Federal Legislation
For a variety of reasons, advocates for LGBT rights are not depending
exclusively upon the EEOC and the federal courts to interpret Title VII and
other existing anti-discrimination statutes in ways favorable to the LGBT
cause. These advocates have their legitimate doubts as to whether such a
strategy will ultimately succeed. They know that Acts of Congress
explicitly prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
95

For recent documentation of the current scope of the problem, see Christy Mallory
& Brad Sears, Evidence of Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation or
Gender Identity: An Analysis of Complaints Filed with State Enforcement Agencies, THE
WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (Oct. 2015), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/workplace/
evidence-of-employment-discrimination-based-on-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identityan-analysis-of-complaints-filed-with-state-enforcement-agencies. See also Jenny Pizer, et
al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination against LGBT People:
The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal
Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 720-42 (2012) (finding that existing legal
protections against LGBT discrimination, including state and local antidiscrimination laws,
are inadequate and incomplete); William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?: An
Empirical Assessment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 76-101 (2001) (responding, based on
empirical data, to common objections to ENDA).
96
See, e.g., EEOC v. Fremont Christian Schools, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that religious entity commits unlawful sex discrimination when, for religious
reasons,  it  offers  health  insurance  only  to  “heads  of  household,”  defined  as  single  parents  
and married males).
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identity will make a more enduring and democratically legitimate statement
than a friendly administrative or judicial construction of a fifty year-old
statute. Moreover, judges will perceive the government interest in
preventing such discrimination as stronger – in RFRA terms, compelling –
if the enactment is recent, purposeful, well explained, and explicit on what
forms of discrimination are forbidden.
Accordingly, advocates of change through new federal legislation are
proceeding vigorously. This path has not been very successful for the past
decade. Even as rights to same sex marriage have expanded in state
legislation as well as the state and federal judiciary, Congress has done little
to explicitly forbid LGBT discrimination.97
Obergefell will enrich and complicate that legislative conversation.
Marriage equality is likely to be a strong driver of other claims of legal
equality, 98 and simultaneously a motivating source of intense opposition to
additional anti-discrimination norms among those who have now lost that
fight. In other words, such a ruling from the Supreme Court may increase
polarization around issues of LGBT rights. Now that marriage equality has
prevailed, the victors will try to ride the front-lash produced by the
normative power of what will have become actual – how can we as a nation
deny rights of equal treatment in housing, credit, employment, and public
accommodation to those whose equal citizenship has just been proclaimed
in the sacred precincts of marriage? 99 And the vanquished may redouble
their efforts to block the perception that inferior treatment based on sexual
97

The Violence Against Women Act, supra note 46, is the only federal statute
containing such a prohibition. In contrast, as of this writing, 22 states and the District of
Columbia have jurisdiction-wide laws prohibiting LGBT discrimination in various fields,
including employment and housing. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex
Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation
Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1190 n.66-67 (2012) (identifying 21 such states).
The only state to expand its anti-discrimination laws recently is Utah in March, 2015. The
paper discusses the Utah legislation in Part III.C., infra.
98
The historical contrast with the evolution of the law of racial discrimination is worth
noting. In that context, statutory protections against discrimination in employment, public
accommodations, and voting all preceded the recognition in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), of a constitutional right to be free from race-based restrictions on marriage. Thus,
resolution of conflict over the most intimate of interpersonal relations occurred relatively
late in the struggle for racial equality. Perhaps the logic of LGBT rights, focused as they
often are on patterns of intimacy, explains why ending marriage discrimination is a logical
or foreseeable precursor to other progress in LGBT rights.
99
See Jonathan Capehart, Legally Married Today, Legally Fired Tomorrow,
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpartisan/wp/2015/02/11/legally-married-today-legally-fired-tomorrow/.
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orientation or gender identity is invidious, akin to discrimination based on
race or color. 100 That perception turns what were once widespread social
and religious norms into a form of bigotry, to be quickly and vehemently
repudiated.
Many opponents of LGBT rights legislation are likely to operate on
two fronts, just as they have in their opposition to marriage equality. The
primary front is straightforward opposition to the change in the legal status
quo, coupled with roll-backs where achievable. 101 The back-up strategy,
which has been highly visible in the legislative wars over marriage, will be
a demand for explicit exemptions from any anti-discrimination legislation
that addresses sexual orientation and gender identity.102
For the back-up strategy to have any chance of success, its supporters
must make the case that religious opposition to LGBT equality deserves
social and moral respect. Moreover, in a campaign for exemptions, specific
exemptions are far superior to broad-based, generic religious exemptions
like RFRA. 103 A RFRA exemption claim is subject to interest-balancing,
and RFRA is so vague that controversial interpretations of it do not confer
full democratic legitimacy. 104 RFRAs are a Rorschach test, on which
100

See, e.g., Gerard Bradley, John Finnis, and Daniel Philpott, The Implications of
Extending Marriage Benefits to Same Sex Couples, THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE (Feb. 22,
2015), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/02/14522/ (arguing that the University of
Notre   Dame’s   extension of employment benefits to same sex spouses of employees is
scandalous, supportive of sexual sin, and morally indefensible).
101
Rollbacks have occurred at the state level. Kansas: Governor Rescinds Order
Protecting Gay State Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/02/11/us/kansas-governor-rescinds-order-protecting-gay-state-workers.html.
Similarly, recent Arkansas legislation preempts local gay rights laws. Aransas Bars
Expanding Local Protections for Gays, Lesbians, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015, 7:08 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/02/23/us/ap-us-xgr-anti-discrimination-laws.html.
102
See infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text (discussing the newly proposed First
Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Congress (1st Sess. 2015)). See also Thomas
Berg, Archive: Memos/Letters on Religious Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage, MIRROR OF
JUSTICE (Aug. 2, 2009), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/
memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html (discussing letters to state
legislatures supporting exemptions related to marriage equality). For broader discussion of
this two front strategy, see Siegel & NeJaime, supra note 60, at 2558-65.
103
For elaboration of this proposition from an ardent defender of such exemptions, see
Robin Fretwell Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social Change: What
Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience Clauses Teach About Specific Exemptions, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 703 (2014).
104
Professor Marshall has a different view of the democratic legitimacy point. William
P. Marshall, Bad Statutes Make Bad Law: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71,
123-24 (2014) (arguing that Hobby Lobby provides political recognition and legitimacy to
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everyone can project their hopes and fears, and cannot be proven wrong
until the courts resolve particular questions. Even when courts do so, the
resolutions are highly fact-specific, so RFRA-based judicial precedents are
rarely generalizable.105
In contrast, specific exemptions, such as the exemption from Title VII
for co-religionist hiring by religious entities,106 are typically not subject to
interest-balancing. More significantly, they clearly identify their
beneficiaries and specify the norms against which the exemptions may be
invoked. So, for example, if non-profit religious entities were to be fully
exempted from a federal law prohibiting LGBT discrimination in
employment, the exemption would be clear and absolute.
In yet another way, this distinction between generic and specific
exemptions is likely to play a crucial role in the political fights to come.
Prior to the decision in Hobby Lobby, in the specific and charged context of
anti-discrimination law, the co-religionist provision in Title VII represented
a legislative baseline about the entitlement to religion-based exemption.
That statutory exemption protects only entities with primary religious
purposes, and hence presumptively excludes for-profit firms.107 Moreover,
that exemption does not extend to exclusions based on race, sex, national
origin, or any forbidden ground of discrimination other than religion.108
the  firm’s  religious  objections  to  contraception).  Professor  Marshall  builds  on  a  comparable  
argument from Professor Fishkin. Joseph Fishkin, Hobby Lobby and the Politics of
Recognition, BALKANIZATION (June 30, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/06/hobbylobby-and-politics-of-recognition.html.
105
I advance this thesis in detail in Lupu, supra note 11.
106
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-1 (2012). The federal Religious
Land   Use   and   Institutionalized   Persons   Act   (“RLUIPA”)   is   a   hybrid,   because   it   relies  
heavily on vague, RFRA-like standards but is limited to the specific contexts of land use
and persons coercively confined by the state. By my terminology, RLUIPA is not a
“specific  exemption”  scheme.
107
See generally Letter from Reed L. Russell, Legal Counsel at the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, to Kevin Cummings, Branch Chief of Business and Trade
Services,  Dep’t  of  Homeland  Sec.,  on  Title  VIII  Religious  Organization  Exceptions  (Dec.  
28, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2007/religious_organization_
exception_dec_28_2007.html.
108
See Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, U.S. Assistant Attorney General to
Randolph D. Moss, Deputy Counsel to the President, at 30–32 (Oct. 12, 2000), available at
http://perma.cc/PAL9-3NE4. For further discussion of the importance of this proposition
for the future of employment discrimination law in the context of LGBT rights, see infra
notes 132-147. The baseline may be different state-to-state. For example, in Utah,
religiously   affiliated   organizations   are   entirely   exempt   from   the   state’s   fair   employment  
law with respect to all categories of discrimination. This made it politically easier to
exempt these organizations from a new prohibition on LGBT discrimination in
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In distinct and opposing ways, Hobby Lobby may profoundly influence
the political battles over demands for specific exemptions. Those who seek
to limit LGBT rights will assert that Hobby Lobby has its own normalizing
effect – in particular, that it broadly legitimizes the concept of religious
privilege. RFRA itself purports to do precisely that, by elevating religious
objections to laws over comparable secular objections. The application of
RFRA in a commercial setting, where religious privilege had been highly
unusual, to say the least, extends the concept to new and unexpected
spheres of life. 109 Once that expansion of religious privilege has become
enshrined in the law, the case to embody it specifically in particular statutes
becomes far less radical. Accordingly, citing this account of Hobby Lobby,
exemption promoters may seek specific exemptions for all religious
objectors – individuals, non-profit organizations, and business firms — to
legal norms of LGBT equality. RFRA already secures religious privilege,
they will argue, so why not clarify the boundaries of the exemption rather
than leave the matter to the uncertainties of litigation?
An early example of the emergence of this strategy can be found in the
proposed   “First   Amendment   Defense   Act.”110 The Act is quite specific in
employment. See infra text at note 216. For commentary on why the Utah model is not the
appropriate national model with respect to discrimination based on sexual orientation or
gender identity, see Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, and Micah Schwartzman, Utah
“Compromise”  to  Protect  LGBT  Citizens  from  Discrimination  is  No  Model  for  the  Nation,
SLATE (Mar. 18 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/18/gay_rights_
the_utah_compromise_is_no_model_for_the_nation.html.
109
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Anomalous & Unjust: Responding to Indiana
RFRA and Beyond, CORNERSTONE (Apr. 27, 2015), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/
cornerstone/rfra-in-indiana-and-beyond/responses/anomalous-and-unjust. Two of my
fellow Symposium participants have sparred over whether Hobby Lobby represents a new
front in religious privilege. Professor Horwitz has argued that the public controversy over
Hobby Lobby represents a breakdown in what had been a consensus about accommodation
of religion. Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014).
Professor Sepper has replied that the consensus, whatever its contours, never extended to
commercial, for-profit actors, especially in contexts where their employees bore the brunt
of the accommodation. Elizabeth Sepper, Reports   of   Accommodation’s   Death   Have   Been  
Greatly Exaggerated, HARV. L. REV. FORUM (Nov. 10, 2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/
2014/11/reports-of-accommodations-death-have-been-greatly-exaggerated. See also James
M. Oleske, Jr., The Born-Again Champion of Conscience, HARV. L. REV. FORUM (Jan. 22,
2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/01/the-born-again-champion-of-conscience (book
review) (arguing that many liberals and liberal organizations  “support  religious  exemptions  
for individuals, while opposing the extension of such exemptions to commercial
businesses.”).
110
H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. (2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114thcongress/house-bill/2802. As of this writing, the future of the First Amendment Defense
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what religious convictions it is designed to protect. It would forbid the
federal government from taking
any discriminatory action against a person, wholly or
partially on the basis that such person believes or acts in
accordance with a religious belief or moral conviction that
marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man
and one woman, or that sexual relations are properly
reserved to such a marriage.111
Although   the   reference   to   “discriminatory   action”   is   vague,   the   Act  
then   specifies   several   examples   of   such   action,   including   revoking   “an  
exemption from taxation under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code,”112 and  denying  “any  Federal  grant,  contract  .  .  .  license,  certification,  
accreditation, employment, or other similar position or status from or to
such   person.”113 The specificity of what religiously motivated actions are
insulated from federal sanction and which punitive measures by government
are barred is in quite sharp contrast to the sweeping and vague generalities
of a scheme like RFRA or its state counterparts.
Moreover, building explicitly on Hobby Lobby, the First Amendment
Defense Act defines person by reference to the U.S. Code definition, 114
which includes corporate persons, and the Act specifically includes “any  .  .  .  
person regardless of religious affiliation or lack thereof, and regardless of
for-profit  or  nonprofit  status.”115 Whether such a proposal, if enacted, would
Act was quite uncertain. See Ed Morrisey, Will the First Amendment Defense Act Fall
Victim to Beltway elbow-throwing?, HOTAIR (July 13, 2015 10:01 AM),
http://hotair.com/archives/2015/07/13/will-the-first-amendment-defense-act-fall-victim-tobeltway-elbow-throwing/; Colby Itkowitz, House GOP Moderates Ready Intraparty Battle
over
Religious
Freedom
Bill,
WASHINGTON POST
(July
17,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/07/17/house-gop-moderatesready-intraparty-battle-over-religious-freedom-bill/.
111
H.R. 2802, supra note 110, at § 3(a).
112
Id. at § 3(b)(1).
113
Id. at § 3(b)(3). A recent survey has found that the IRS has not revoked the tax
exemption of a religious entity on the grounds that its teachings are contrary to public
policy since 1978, when racially discriminatory policies of various schools led to the
decision in Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574. See Sam Brunson, The Church Will Not Lose
its
Tax
Exempt
Status,
BY
COMMON
CONSENT
(July
9,
2015),
http://bycommonconsent.com/2015/07/09/the-church-will-not-lose-its-tax-exempt-status/.
114
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2755. H.R. 2802, supra note 110, at § 6.2(c)
(referencing  “section  1  of  title  1,  United  States  Code”).
115
Id.
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provide a better defense than RFRA for a business that refused to treat a
same-sex marriage as valid for purposes of compliance with federal law is
somewhat uncertain, because of the undefined quality of the catch-all
prohibition   on   “discriminatory   action.” Enforcing general statutes like the
Family  and  Medical  Leave  Act  is  hardly  “discriminatory.”  Nevertheless, the
First Amendment Defense Act is a good example of the specific exemption
strategy that I expect will take hold at both the federal and state level.
In the context of anti-discrimination law and otherwise, those who seek
to expand LGBT rights in federal law are likely to fight fiercely against any
such accommodations. They may oppose even the narrowest of exemptions
for religious entities, including houses of worship. First, LGBT rights
groups will persistently contest the idea that religious opposition to the
intimate lives of LGBT people is culturally or morally respectable. Over
time, that idea is likely to become marginalized in ways akin to what
eventually transpired with respect to public support for slavery or racial
segregation.116
Second, these groups will object to the notion that Hobby Lobby
normalized any broad baseline of religious privilege. From their
perspective, explicit religious exemptions should not extend to for-profit
business firms. Nor should accommodations for non-profit religious entities
go any further than the pre-existing co-religionist preference in Title VII,
which cannot be implemented in ways that discriminate against protected
classes.117
Third, and most significantly, LGBT rights groups will insist that
Hobby Lobby must be read to permit only those exemptions that do not
inflict harm on third parties. The  decision,  as  Justice  Kennedy’s  concurring  
opinion predicted, has now produced an accommodation designed to ensure
that employees of objecting for-profit firms eventually receive the disputed
coverage through a third party. 118 Accordingly, Hobby Lobby remains
116

For a careful exploration of why religious objections to same sex marriage have
been afforded so much more respect than were comparable objections to inter-racial
intimacy, see Oleske, Jr., supra note 59.
117
See infra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
118
134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Obama Administration has created
such an accommodation, see Coverage of Preventive Services under the Affordable Care
Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41318 et seq., (July 14, 2015), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2015-07-14/pdf/2015-17076.pdf. The new policy builds upon the accommodation
that has been in place for religious non-profits. The non-profit accommodation remains
mired in RFRA-based litigation. See supra note 65. The new for-profit accommodation
may yet be challenged in court, and in any event will not lead to contraceptive coverage
until the beginning of the next insurance plan coverage year. 80 Fed. Reg. at 41322.
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constrained by a concern that third parties suffer no material harm.119 If it so
bounded, exemptions from anti-discrimination laws must be strictly limited.
The proposed First Amendment Defense Act would violate that limit if it
permits private parties to refuse to recognize the validity of a same-sex
marriage, in contexts where that denial would deprive parties to such a
marriage of valuable rights or benefits.
Fourth, in light of Hobby Lobby, LGBT rights proponents will be
rightly concerned that any specific exemption or accommodation for some
religious interests will put a significant burden on the government to explain
why the accommodation should not be extended to other religious
claimants, business firms or others. 120 For supporters of LGBT rights,
Hobby Lobby has made the bargaining chip, represented by specific
exemptions, far more dangerous or expensive to play.
The existing federal baseline for exceptional treatment of religious
organizations, and the accompanying concern for third party harms,
profoundly influenced the debate over President   Obama’s   decision   to  
amend long-standing Executive Order 11246 to include sexual orientation
and gender identity as prohibited grounds of discrimination in employment
by persons or firms contracting with the federal government.121 Prior to the
119

Loewentheil, supra note 5. This proposition of course remains in doubt, and
Professor Nelson Tebbe has testified before a House subcommittee that RFRA should be
amended to make that limitation explicit. Hearing on Oversight of RFRA and RLUIPA
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. 6-7 (2015) (statement of Professor Nelson Tebbe), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/497441bc-b2fa-4b10-8ade-91f6603588fe/tebbe02132015.pdf. A significant part of the intellectual and jurisprudential push for this
proposal comes from the argument that the Establishment Clause requires that RFRA be
limited in this way. See Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. 703. For the fullest defense of this
line of argument in the context of the Hobby Lobby litigation, see Frederick Gedicks &
Rebecca Van Tassel, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014).
120
Soon   after   the   Supreme   Court’s   Hobby Lobby decision, a major part of the LGBT
rights coalition withdrew its support for any broad exemption, from the then-proposed
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. § 815 (2013), for religious
non-profit entities. See Chris Geidner, Three Reasons LGBT Groups are Fighting Over a
Bill  That  Isn’t  Going  to  Become  Law, BUZZFEED (July 9, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
chrisgeidner/three-reasons-lgbt-groups-are-fighting-over-a-bill-that-isnt. One reason the
withdrawing groups cited was the possibility that Hobby Lobby would encourage RFRA
objections to ENDA by for-profit firms, and that those objections might be strengthened if
ENDA exempted religious non-profits. Id. The exemption proposed in H.R. 1755 was very
broad, effectively removing religious entities entirely from coverage, without regard to
whether they had religious objections to same sex intimacy. See id.
121
Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014).
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issuance  of  President  Obama’s  Order, opposing interests conducted a fierce
public debate on whether it should include a broad and categorical
exemption for religious non-profits. A group of faith leaders called on the
President to include such an exemption in the Executive Order. 122 Other
faith leaders and a group of legal scholars, myself included, urged the
President to issue the Order without a categorical exemption for religious
entities.123
As issued, the Order did not include the requested exemption. Instead,
it left intact Section 204 (c) of the Order, which is in perfect alignment with
the Title VII co-religionist exemption;124 that is, the Order preserved the
pre-existing statutory baseline for exemption from anti-discrimination law.
The analysis in this paper suggests strongly that the President acted
prudently in resisting the demands from some faith leaders that non-profit
religious entities be broadly excluded from the new provision in the
Executive Order. Had President Obama yielded to these entreaties, forprofit firms that wished to rely on RFRA to likewise discriminate would
have jumped on any such exclusion. These firms would have argued that the
exclusion showed that a) the President had affirmed a new baseline of broad
accommodation of religious objection to LGBT rights measures; b) in
RFRA terms, the government interest was less than compelling because a
broad   exemption   had   left   “appreciable   damage   to   that supposedly vital
interest un-prohibited;;”   and   c) as in Hobby Lobby, the accommodation
could readily be extended to for-profit firms with religious objections to
compliance with the new Order. That the Order, as issued, retains only the
pre-existing right of religious entities to prefer co-religionists—a right that
122

Michelle Boorstein, Faith Leaders: Exempt Religious Groups from Order Barring
LGBT
Bias
in
Hiring,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(July
2,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/faith-leaders-exempt-religious-groups-from-orderbarring-lgbt-bias-in-hiring/2014/07/02/d82e68da-01f1-11e4-b8ff-89afd3fad6bd_story.html.
123
See Letter from Faith Group Leaders to President Barack Obama (July 8, 2014)
(urging no exclusion of religious entities from the proposed order), available at
https://www.dropbox.com/s/8wzzpbviygds1pv/Faith%20Letter%20to%20President%20De
fending%20Exec%20Order%202014-07-08%20FINAL.pdf; Letter from Legal Scholars to
President Barack Obama (July 14, 2014) (urging no exclusion of religious entities),
available at https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality
/executive_order_letter_final_0.pdf.
124
Section  204(c)  provides  that  the  Order  “shall not apply to a Government contractor
or subcontractor that is a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society, with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational
institution,  or  society  of  its  activities.” Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept.
24, 1965), available at http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/statutes/eo11246.htm.
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no court has ever extended under Title VII or RFRA to a for-profit
business 125 — renders the Order much less vulnerable to a Hobby Lobby
style attack from a for-profit religious objector.
This episode, which went through its final stages in the immediate
aftermath of Hobby Lobby, should be instructive for legislative fights going
forward. LGBT rights groups have recently advanced a sweeping proposal,
under   the   umbrella   title   “The   Equality   Act,”   to   expand   federal antidiscrimination laws to cover sexual orientation and gender identity, in the
contexts of (among others) credit, education, employment, housing, and
public accommodations. 126 For all the reasons suggested above, this
package includes no categorical exemptions for religious entities.
Moreover, the proposal includes a specific exclusion of RFRA claims from
all relevant federal antidiscrimination laws.127
That proposed exclusion of RFRA claims will raise the stakes
considerably in legislative debate over specific exemptions from LGBT
anti-discrimination law. If religiously motivated interests do not get specific
statutory protection in any new anti-discrimination laws, they will have no
escape whatsoever from compliance. They will thus fight the laws
intensely, and they will fight just as intensely for exemptions from any laws
that might pass. Groups advocating for LGBT rights will fight for the laws
and against the exemptions with equal fervor.
In the past, the leading example of this kind of struggle involved the
never-enacted federal Employment Non-Discrimination   Act   (“ENDA”),
which would have prohibited employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity. Over a number of years and Congresses, the
125

See EEOC v. Townley Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 617–19 (9th Cir. 1988) (for-profit
corporation cannot qualify for Title VII exemption of religious corporations from the ban
on preferring co-religionists). For broader discussion of which employers are covered by
the co-religionist exemption, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Religious Exemptions
and the Limited Relevance of Corporate Identity, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY (Zoe Robinson, Chad Flanders, Micah Schwartzman, eds., forthcoming 2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535991.
126
See references to the proposed Equality Act, supra note 13. See generally, Human
Rights Campaign, Beyond Marriage Equality: A Blueprint for Federal Non-Discrimination
Protections,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN
http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east1.amazonaws.com//files/documents/HRC-BeyondMarriageEquality-42015.pdf (last visited
Sept. 27, 2015).
127
See H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. § 1107 (2015) (excluding RFRA claims and defenses
under all the titles of federal law covered by the Act). The exclusion would not be limited
to sexual orientation and gender identity claims; it would extend to all categories of
forbidden discrimination (race, sex, national origin, etc.) under the covered titles of
antidiscrimination law. Id.

38

Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 7

leading ENDA proposals included a complete exemption for all employers
that qualify for the existing co-religionist exemption. 128 That is, if an
employer was free under Title VII to limit hiring to co-religionists, 129 it
would not be subject to  ENDA,  without  regard  to  the  employer’s  religious
precepts on same-sex intimacy. In the summer of 2014, after the Supreme
Court announced the Hobby Lobby decision, a number of groups supporting
ENDA withdrew their support on the ground that the proposed religious
organizational exemption was too broad.130
Consider the competing policy positions on the extent to which
religious organizations should be exempt from the proposed Equality Act,
or any comparable enactment. The most employer-friendly version is a
complete exemption. The alternative is the creation of no special exemption
from a prohibition on discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity; instead, religious organizations would retain their statutory right to
prefer co-religionists.131 The difference between these positions is wide and
significant. A complete exemption represents an unprecedented expansion
of the baseline of religious privilege; with respect to non-ministerial
positions, 132 employers that qualify for the co-religionist exemption have
always been subject to all other prohibitions on discrimination, including
race, sex, age, disability, and national origin. A complete exemption would

128

See H.R.  1755,  113th  Cong.§  6  (2013)  (“[T]his Act shall not apply to a corporation,
association, educational institution or institution of learning, or society that is exempt from
the religious discrimination provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pursuant
…  to section 702(a) or 703(e)(2) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e–1(a), 2000e–2(e)(2)).”
129
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012). (“This  subchapter shall
not  apply  …  to  a  religious  corporation,  association,  educational  institution,  or  society  with  
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of
its  activities.”).
130
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
131
The  text  of  the  proposed  Equality  Act  “would  continue  to  allow
religious corporations, associations, educational institutions, and societies to hire only
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with their religious
activities.”   SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY ET AL., SECTION BY SECTION SUMMARY OF THE
EQUALITY ACT 2 (2015), available at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
EqualityAct_SectionBySection.pdf (summarizing  “Section  7.  Employment.”)
132
The constitutionally based ministerial exception effectively removes ministerial
positions from all anti-discrimination laws. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). See also LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note
35, at 43-45, 54-61 (explaining and justifying the ministerial exception on Establishment
Clause grounds).
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thus constitute a significant departure from the existing baseline,
represented by the co-religionist exemption, for hiring by religious entities.
Is there any justification for a complete exemption for religious
organizations from a prohibition on LGBT discrimination, rather than a
continuation of the legal status quo, in which religious organizations retain
their co-religionist hiring privilege but nothing more? In an article
admirable for its tone and balance, 133 Professor Alan Brownstein has
developed arguments that lead him in the direction of the complete
exemption. Professor Brownstein asserts that religious identity and sexual
orientation are comparable, in many respects, as defining elements of a
person’s  life.134 From this premise, he reasons that the extent of the right to
be selective – that is, to discriminate – with respect to religion should
frequently line up with the right to be selective with respect to sexual
orientation. This leads him to tentatively conclude, in this article and in
recent testimony to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, that  “when  Title  VII  
is amended to protect members of the LGBT community against
employment discrimination, an additional exemption for religious
organizations permitting them to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation or identity, similar in scope to the [702] exemption, may be
justified.”135
Professor   Brownstein’s   view is premised on a misreading of the
relevant law, and would produce poor policy results. The misreading is his
assumption that the existing co-religionist exemption extends to exclusion
of those whose religious identity is undesirable to the employer. On that
view, an employer covered by the exemption could have a policy of hiring
anyone except a Jew, or a Mormon, or an atheist. Were that correct,
extension of the policy would permit exclusion of LGBT people. But this
understanding of the exemption – as a right to exclude the religiously
undesirable -- does not comport with the language, purpose, or judicial
interpretation of the exemption.
133

Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for
Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same Sex Couples to
Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389 (2010).
134
Id. at 400-409.
135
Alan Brownstein, Examining Workplace Discrimination Against Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, and Transgender Americans, U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS 6 (Mar. 16, 2015)
(copy on file with author and with ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV). See also supra note 133, at
424-25   (explaining   that   under   Brownstein’s   model,   “Title   VII’s   exemption   of   non-profit
religious   organizations   from   the   statute’s   prohibition   against   religious   discrimination   in  
hiring would  extend  to  the  hiring  of  married  gays  and  lesbians.”).
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The exemption reads: “This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.” 136 As judicially
explained, the exemption is designed to permit religious entities to carry out
their mission by preferring members of their own faith. Concurring in Amos
v. Corporation of Presiding Bishops, 137 the decision in which the Court
upheld the exemption against Establishment Clause attack, Justice Brennan
wrote, “We are willing to countenance the imposition of [religious criteria
for employment] because we deem it vital that, if certain activities
constitute part of a religious community's practice, then a religious
organization should be able to require that only members of its community
perform  those  activities.”138
The co-religionist exemption thus permits religious entities to prefer
members of their own religious community for the purposes of carrying out
the   organization’s   mission. It does not, however, extend to excluding
members of faiths that the employer views as undesirable. Professor
Brownstein’s  suggestion  that  LGBT  antidiscrimination  proposals include a
complete exemption for religious organizations, on the ground that it maps
onto their existing authority to prefer co-religionists, is flawed.
Once the analogy fails, it remains to be determined as a matter of
policy whether religious organizations should have a complete exemption
from   the   Equality   Act’s   employment   provisions or still be limited to their
co-religionist exemption. The complete exemption, for reasons just
discussed, is anomalous. It would permit religious organizations to refuse to
hire, or to dismiss, a person based on sexual orientation or gender identity,
whether or not the person had acted in ways that violated the organization’s  
religious principles. It is thus entirely overbroad in relation to religious
need. Moreover, if religious organizations had the benefit of a complete
exemption,  the  result  would  frequently  be  an  iteration  of  “Don’t  Ask,  Don’t  
Tell.” An LGBT employee of a religious organization that would fire
anyone who openly revealed that status would have to remain closeted.
136

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012).
483 U.S. 327 (1987).
138
Id. at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Boyd v. Harding Academy of
Memphis, 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[Section 702] does not, however, exempt
religious educational institutions with respect to all discrimination. It merely indicates that
such institutions may choose to employ members of their own religion without fear of being
charged with religious discrimination.") (emphasis added).
137
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Needless  to  say,  a  same  sex  marriage  is  a  “tell,”  so  an  employee  in  such  a  
marriage would have to refrain from claiming spousal benefits available to
others, or otherwise disclosing the sex of his spouse.
Does the pre-existing co-religionist exemption satisfy the relevant
interests? The right to prefer co-religionists is not limited to matters of
religious identity or affiliation. By judicial interpretation, it extends to
practices forbidden or required by religious faith. 139 An Orthodox Jewish
congregation, for example, could fire an Orthodox Jewish employee for
failing to follow Jewish dietary laws, or for disrespecting the Sabbath.
At first glance, the principle that the co-religionist exemption extends
to practices in compliance with faith, as well as to identity and affiliation,
suggests that the exemption would permit firing of an employee for being
sexually active with a person of the same sex, if the religious employer held
to principles condemning such practices. As noted above, however, the law
constrains the co-religionist exemption with another, equally powerful
principle – the relevant religious prohibition may not run afoul of other
prohibited categories of discrimination. 140 The Orthodox Jewish
congregation referred to above would not be free to fire females who broke
the Sabbath, while giving a pass to males who behaved identically.
Similarly, a religious corporation would be free to discriminate against
LGBT persons only if it relied on a religious norm that was itself nondiscriminatory. As I have explained elsewhere,141 “such  an  employer  might  
exclude from employment any person who divorced and remarried, but the
employer would have to enforce this norm against all employees, and could
not use it as a pretext for discriminating against LGBT employees. More
pointedly, any bright-line exclusion of same-sex spouses from family
benefits, coupled with a practice of inclusion of all opposite-sex spouses,
would  be  in   direct   violation”  of  a  prohibition  against  discrimination   based  
on sexual orientation or gender identity.
Limiting religious entities to the existing baseline, represented by the
co-religionist exemption, thus represents a salutary move in the direction of
139

See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F. 2d 944 (3rd Cir. 1991) (upholding dismissal of
Catholic school teacher who entered a marriage not recognized by the Church).
140
See Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, U.S. Assistant Attorney General to
William P. Marshall, Deputy Counsel to the President 30–32 (Oct. 12, 2000), available at
http://perma.cc/PAL9-3NE4. See also Lederman, supra note 81; Rose Saxe, The Truth
About Religious Employers and Civil Rights Laws, CORNERSTONE BLOG (July 28, 2014),
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-truth-about-religious-employers-andcivil-rights-laws, archived at http:// perma.cc/9CZD-XJJZ.
141
Lupu, supra note 11, at 96.
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organizational accountability. The limitation would force these employers
to justify, as a matter of religious principle, any adverse job action based on
sexual orientation or gender identity. Identifying that principle would
clarify any potential ground of exclusion, and block the use of inherently
discriminatory grounds. If religious organizations must articulate grounds
that are neutral with respect to sexual orientation, they can maintain and
enforce much of their teaching on sexuality without favoring heterosexuals.
For example, they can insist that their employees refrain from sex outside of
marriage, but they would have to respect same sex marriage equally with
different sex marriage.
Concerned religious organizations will no doubt assert that limiting
them to the co-religionist exemption, constrained in this way, will not
permit them to fully realize their religious principles in the workplace. But
that is always true of the operation of the exemption. For a leading example,
religious communities that believe that women should be subordinate to
men cannot manifest these principles in their hiring policies.142 Nothing in
the context of sexual orientation or gender identity justifies a departure from
that limitation.
Significantly, religious organizations still retain the ministerial
exception,143 which gives them full authority to restrict in any way hiring
for positions as clergy or other positions responsible for teaching the faith.
Religious entities also retain complete control over their religious teaching
about human sexuality. 144 Moreover, religious organizations may adjust
their employee benefit policies to include a wide array of domestic
partners,145 including spouses, or to eliminate family benefits altogether.146
142

EEOC v. Fremont Christian Schools, 781 F. 2d 1362, 1364 (9 th Cir. 1986) (finding a
violation   of   Title   VII   in   Christian   school’s   religion-based policy that only single persons
and   married   men   can   qualify   as   “head   of   household”   for   purposes   of   employer-provided
health insurance).
143
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 .
144
For a comparable analysis in a somewhat different context, see Nan D. Hunter,
Pluralism and its Perils: Navigating the Tension Between Gay Rights and Religious
Expression, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 435 (2014).
145
Catholic Charities in Maine and San Francisco,  CA  have  adopted  this  sort  of  “plus  
one”   policy,   permitting   employees   to   designate   any   adult   to   receive   employee   benefit  
coverage without regard to whether the designated adult is a spouse or intimate partner.
Maine Charity to Provide Domestic Partner Benefits, UNMARRIED AMERICA (Nov. 14,
2002), http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/members/news/2002/November-DP/ME_charity_
to_provide_dp_benefits_Nov_14,2002.html.
146
After the District of Columbia enacted a law permitting same-sex marriage, Catholic
Charities of DC eliminated spousal benefits for employees in order to avoid coverage of
same-sex spouses. See Archdiocese of Washington Ends Spousal Benefits, Citing Gay
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As this discussion reveals, compromise over the form of the Equality
Act, and any religious exemption it may contain, will be very difficult.
Traditional religious organizations will want a complete exemption; LGBT
rights groups will fiercely resist that. Moreover, Hobby Lobby may have
widened considerably the gap   between   each   side’s   approach   to   the issues.
Hobby Lobby’s   false   promise   of   a   new,   generic   baseline   of   religious  
privilege, expanded to commercial actors acting in discriminatory ways,
may reinforce conservative hold outs from any new legislation. And Hobby
Lobby’s  threat  that specific accommodation of some objectors will produce
an invitation to RFRA-based accommodation of all objectors will equally
reinforce progressive resistance to even the narrowest religious exemption.
Holding the line on the co-religionist exemption, in its present scope, has
become by far the most sensible strategy for the LGBT rights campaign.147
Whether that will be acceptable to religious organizations is an open
question.
As advocates of LGBT rights seek new protections in federal law, they
will face many obstacles. Hobby Lobby is now among those obstacles,
because of the legal and political legitimation it appears to provide to claims
of religious exemption in a commercial context. Indeed, because the RFRA
purports to restore constitutional norms that the Supreme Court had
abandoned, Hobby Lobby appears to provide constitutional legitimation as
Marriage Law, LGBTQ NATION (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/
2010/03/archdiocese-of-washington-ends-spousal-benefits-citing-gay-marriage-law.
147
One other context of federal law deserves mention, because its baseline is different,
and far less hospitable to claims of religious privilege. In the development of President
George  W.  Bush’s Faith Based and Community Initiative, and its inclusion of faith-based
organizations as potential federal grantees in the delivery of social services, the Executive
Branch firmly and explicitly prohibited any religious discrimination among beneficiaries.
Exec. Order No. 13279, 67 C.F.R. 241, § 2(d) (Dec. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2002-12-16/pdf/02-31831.pdf. A faith-based grantee
may not exclude or discriminate against any beneficiary based on faith commitments,
membership in a religious community, willingness to engage in any form of worship, or
any other ground that has its basis in religious norms. Id. § 2(f). In this context, therefore,
the baseline is one of no religious privilege whatsoever. For an account of current
controversies concerning the role of RFRA with respect to religious selectivity by grantees
with respect to employees, and to the choice of services available to beneficiaries, see Chris
Geidner, Progressive Groups Ask Obama to End Bush-Era Religious Protection,
BUZZFEED (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/progressive-groupsask-obama-to-end-bush-era-religious-prote#.akrNXnME0; Sarah Posner, Discrimination
on  the  Taxpayer’s  Dime?  The  Fight  to  Curtail  the  Overreach  of  RFRA,   USCANNENBERG:
RELIGION DISPATCHES (Apr. 30, 2015), http://religiondispatches.org/discrimination-on-thetaxpayers-dime-the-fight-to-curtail-the-overreach-of-rfra/.
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well. In an ironic twist, however, Hobby Lobby may turn out to be a friend
of the LGBT rights movement. The decision provides a principled reason to
oppose statutory exceptions to new anti-discrimination laws for any and all
religious objectors; if LGBT rights advocates give an inch, they may lose a
RFRA-pushed mile. Indeed, Hobby Lobby gives LGBT rights advocates
strong grounds to assert the necessity of a generic exclusion from
antidiscrimination laws of RFRA claims and defenses. 148 Whether that
stance wins the day, or precludes all possibility of compromise, remains to
be seen.
III. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND LGBT PROTECTIONS IN STATE LAW
Recent events in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, and elsewhere
have brought to prominence the intense conflict under state and local law
between the possibility of LGBT rights and claims of religious freedom. For
many reasons, the state law story of the relationship between Hobby Lobby
and LGBT rights is significantly different from the federal version. The
Federal RFRA, and Hobby Lobby’s  interpretation  of  it, are applicable only
to federal law. Those who complain of burdens on religious freedom from
application of state anti-discrimination law must look to state constitutions,
state RFRAs, or specific state statutory exemptions. Instead of a single,
national jurisdiction, the state-centered narrative involves fifty different
state jurisdictions, plus potential conflict between relevant state and local
law.
The sections that follow subdivide the subject of state law into three
parts. Part A appraises the current legal situation, which has two key
components. Part A first describes the wide geographical disconnect
between religious liberty legislation and statewide LGBT protections in
anti-discrimination law, and then addresses the handful of decisions
involving vendors who have refused to serve same-sex weddings. Part B
focuses on the likelihood of new state legislation and the ways in which
Hobby Lobby may influence the relevant political discourse. Part C analyzes
the possible impact of Hobby Lobby on future state court adjudication of the
conflicts that these laws may produce.

148

The proposed Equality Act would do precisely that. See text at note 127, supra.
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A. Current Circumstances – Legislation and Adjudication.
1. The Legislative Mismatch
The current distribution of state-wide laws on LGBT rights and
religious liberty reveals a stark mismatch. This paper opened with an
extreme example—Alabama has a RFRA in its state constitution, but has no
statewide laws that forbid discrimination in employment or public
accommodations. 149 More typically, many states with strong religious
liberty protections do have prohibitions on some forms of employment
discrimination, but do not include LGBT discrimination among the
prohibited grounds.150 A number of blue states reveal the opposite pattern—
state-wide anti-discrimination laws that include sexual orientation and
gender identity, and no RFRA to set against them.151
More precisely, the mismatched numbers reveal the following: twentytwo states (and D.C.) have jurisdiction-wide laws that forbid discrimination
based on LGBT status in employment, housing, and/or public
accommodations. 152 Twenty-one states now have RFRAs modeled on the
federal Act. 153 The overlap between these two sets is four—Connecticut,
149

See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Similarly, Mississippi added a RFRA to
its laws in 2014. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-61-1 (2014). Like Alabama, Mississippi has no
state wide regime of anti-discrimination laws with respect to employment or public
accommodations. Id.
150
See James Oleske, State Inaction, Equal Protection, and Religious Resistance to
LGBT Rights, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2589743. Professor Oleske argues in this piece that states
with anti-discrimination laws that do not include sexual orientation as a forbidden
classification are acting in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at (SSRN version)
27-42.
151
Lupu, supra note 11, at 99 n.312.
152
Id. (citing NeJaime, supra note 102, at 1190 n.66–67 (asserting that 21 states follow
this model)). Of these twenty-one states, only Wisconsin, New York, and New Hampshire
omit gender identity as a forbidden ground of discrimination. See Non-Discrimination
Laws: State by State Information—Map, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map
(last
visited Sept. 27, 2015). Recent legislation on LGBT rights and religious liberty made Utah
the twenty-second state on this list. See Brady McCombs & Kelly Catalfamo, Mormon
Church Backs Utah LGBT Anti-Discrimination Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.chron.com/news/us/article/Mormon-church-backs-Utah-anti-discrimination-bill
-6114748.php.
153
See Marci Hamilton, Here is What is Happening in Your State, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT PERILS, http://rfraperils.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (confirming
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Illinois, New Mexico, and Rhode Island are currently the only states that
have RFRAs and state-wide anti-discrimination laws that include LGBT
status. 154 In addition, another eight states have the combination of broad
anti-discrimination laws and state constitutional provisions that have been
construed in ways akin to the pre-Smith, pre-RFRA regime of free exercise
adjudication. 155 Accordingly, under current law, only twelve states—four
with RFRAs plus eight with constitutional norms—present the possibility of
strong conflict between state-wide LGBT anti-discrimination laws and
statewide religious freedom laws.
Local law offers another dimension to the possible clashes. In a
considerable number of states that have RFRAs, are considering RFRAs, or
have strong constitutional protections for religious exercise, local
jurisdictions have enacted LGBT anti-discrimination laws. These include
(among many others) Phoenix, Arizona, where proposed amendments to the
state’s religious freedom law produced a political uproar,156 nearly costing
the state the 2015 Super Bowl; and Atlanta, Georgia, where a proposed state
level RFRA generated considerable controversy, and eventually died as a
result of concern that it would promote discrimination against members of
same sex couples and others.157

21 states with RFRAs currently). As discussed below, Hobby Lobby may manifest
persuasive (though not binding) effects on interpretation of similarly worded state RFRAs.
154
Lupu, supra note 11, at 99, n.312.
155
These states are Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New York, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. (providing NeJaime list of states with LGBT laws); see
also Loewentheil, supra note 5. These state constitutional patterns, too, may ultimately be
influenced, though they are not in any way bound, by Hobby Lobby’s  explication  of  federal  
religious freedom principles, both constitutional and statutory.
156
Lupu, supra note 11, at 44, n.25.
157
Kathleen Foody, Georgia Lawmakers Leave without Vote on Religious Freedom
Bill, WASH. TIMES (Ap. 3, 2015), http://www.ajc.com/ap/ap/georgia/religious-freedommeasure-focus-of-ga-lawmakers-la/nkkq2/. I was among the signatories of a Letter from
Legal Scholars in opposition to the Georgia proposal. Letter from Ira C. Lupu et al., F.
Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law Emeritus, George Washington University, to
Nathan Deal et al., Governor of Georgia (Jan. 21, 2015), available at
http://www.georgiaunites.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Georgia-Religious-FreedomLetter.pdf. For further detail about local LGBT-protecting laws, see State Resource Map,
THE WILLIAMS INST., http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/#mapwrap (last visited Sept. 27,
2015).
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2. Recent and Current Litigation
The mismatch between LGBT rights-oriented states and RFRA states
explains in part the relative infrequency of the oft-discussed legal conflicts
between wedding vendors who object to same sex marriage, and members
of same-sex couples seeking goods and services for wedding celebrations.
The frequency of such disputes is not zero, however, and the vendors thus
far have never successfully defeated discrimination claims against them.
Elane Photography v. Willock,158 decided in 2013, is the most well known
of these cases. In Elane Photography, the New Mexico Supreme Court
avoided   dealing   with   the   potential   conflict   between   the   state’s   Human  
Rights Act and its RFRA by ruling that RFRA applied only in governmentinitiated actions, and not in actions between private parties.159
Other cases remain relatively scarce. The Gortz Haus, an Iowa gift
shop and bistro, settled a discrimination case based on its refusal to host
same sex wedding celebrations. 160 The Liberty Ridge Farm case in New
York State is on appeal to state courts from an administrative finding of
discrimination, and consequent damage liability, against a family-owned
farm that hosted weddings but refused to be available for a same sex
wedding. 161 A similar case from Colorado, involving Masterpiece
158

284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). At the time of suit and decision in Elane Photography, New
Mexico did not recognize civil marriage between same sex partners. Id. The legal status of
marriage is irrelevant to these disputes. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Apocalypse
Now?, CORNERSTONE BLOG (June 29, 2015), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/
cornerstone/obergefell-v-hodges-the-ruling-and-its-implications-for-religiousfreedom/responses/apocalypse-now.
159
309 P.3d at 76–78. The Ocean Grove case in New Jersey, while not involving a
typical vendor, is another prominent example of a dispute between a same sex couple and a
provider of space for a wedding celebration. Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting
Ass'n, 2012 WL 169302 (N.J. Adm. 2012). Professor Tuttle and I carefully analyze the
Ocean Grove case in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and
Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 279-282 (2010).
160
Grant Rodgers, Grimes’   Gortz   Haus   to   Stop All Weddings in Wake of
Discrimination Complaint, DES MOINES REGISTER (Jan. 28, 2015, 6:49 PM),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/investigations/2015/01/28/gortz-haus-owne
rs-decide-stop-weddings/22492677/?hootPostID=%5B%22%5B%277f196770f8af7162828
75c2320afaadc%27%5D%22%5D. Iowa has neither a RFRA nor a body of state
constitutional law especially sensitive to impact of laws on religious exercise.
161
See N.Y.   Farm   Fined   $13,000   for   Refusing   to   host   Lesbian   Couple’s   Wedding,
LGBTQ NATION (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2014/08/n-y-farm-fined13000-for-refusing-to-host-lesbian-couples-wedding/.
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Cakeshop, produced an identical disposition from a state administrative law
judge,162 recently affirmed by an intermediate appellate court.163 Iowa, New
York, and Colorado are among the states that do not have a RFRA.
Two other prominent cases in progress are on the West Coast – the
Klein case (Sweetcakes by Melissa) in Oregon, involving a bakery that
refused to prepare a cake for a same sex wedding reception, 164 and the
Ingersoll case in Washington State, involving a florist who refused to
provide floral arrangements for a same sex wedding.165 In the Oregon case,
an administrative law judge gave summary judgment to the prosecuting
agency, and rejected all constitutional defenses, state and federal, offered by
the Kleins. Oregon lacks a RFRA, and its state constitutional protection for
religion against incidental burdens is weak.166
The Ingersoll case, in which a Superior Court judge gave summary
judgment to Washington State and the complaining same-sex couple, may
prove to be the most substantively significant so far. Washington State does
not have a RFRA, but its state constitution has been construed in a religionsupportive way,167 akin to federal Free Exercise Clause precedents prior to
the decision in Employment Division v. Smith. Nevertheless, in what
appears to be the first head-on confrontation between an LGBT
discrimination claim and rights asserted under a religion-protective state
law regime, Superior Court Judge Ekstrom ruled emphatically against the
flower shop and its owner. Although Judge Ekstrom was willing to assume
that application of anti-discrimination law substantially burdened the
florist,168 he concluded that the state had a compelling interest in combating
discrimination based on sexual orientation.169 He then rejected as legally
162

See Zahira Torres, Civil Rights Commission Says Lakewood Bakery Discriminated
Against Gay Couple, DENVER POST (May 30, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/news/
ci_25865871/civil-rights-commission-says-lakewood-baker-discriminated-against.
163
Craig and Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 2015COA115 (Colo. Ct. App.
2015), available at https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Court_of_Appeals/Opinion/
2015/14CA1351-PD.pdf.
164
In the Matter of Melissa Elaine Klein, dba Sweetcakes by Melissa, 2015 WL
4868796 (OR BOLI 2015).
165
Washington  v.  Arlene’s  Flowers,  Inc.,  and  Ingersoll  &  Freed  v.  Arlene’s  Flowers,  Inc.,  
No. 13-2-00871-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2015) available at http://www.adfmedia.org/
files/ArlenesFlowersSJruling.pdf.
166
See, e.g., Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 903 P.2d 351 (Or. 1995)
(containing the reasoning the administrative law judge relied on in Klein).
167
See, e.g., Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 211 P. 3d 406 (Wash.
2009).
168
Ingersoll, No. 13-2-00871-5, at 47-48.
169
Id. at 48-50.
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insufficient the alternative of referral to other, willing florists by the
service-refusing florist; that alternative, he reasoned, was effectively a
permission slip for discrimination.170
The Ingersoll case is not over; the case is now on appeal to a higher
state court in Washington. 171 Washington does not have a RFRA.
170

Id. at 50-51. In her paper for this Symposium, Elizabeth Sepper develops further the
arguments against a system of referrals as an adequate alternative for a generally applicable
prohibition on discrimination. Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moral Marketplace, 7 ALA.
C.R. & C.L. L. REV (forthcoming 2016).
171
See Ingersoll  v.  Arlene’s  Flowers,  Inc.,  No.  13-2-00953-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2015),
available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/ArlenesFlowersAppealNotice.pdf. Ingersoll
also presents an issue that appears in other wedding vendor cases—whether application of
anti-discrimination law in the case of services with a creative component violates the First
Amendment’s   prohibition   on   compelled   speech.   In   Elane Photography, the New Mexico
Supreme  Court  rejected  the  photographer’s  compelled  speech  defense.  Elane Photography,
309 P.3d at 63–76. In Ingersoll, Judge Ekstrom rejected the argument. He  wrote,  “Because  
anti-discrimination laws by their nature require equal treatment, they cannot be defeated by
the claim that equal treatment requires communication or expression with which the
speaker  disagrees.”  Ingersoll, No. 13-2-00953-3 at 39. For a smart and broader take on this
question, see Hunter, supra note 144 (arguing that obedience to anti-discrimination law is
not inherently expressive).
When a vendor generally refuses to publish messages with which she disagrees, the
compelled speech argument may have some force. See Hands-On Originals, Inc. v.
Lexington-Fayette  Urban  Cnty.  Human  Rights  Comm’n,  No.  14-CI-04474 (Fayette Cir. Ct.
3d Div. 2015), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HandsOnOriginalsDecision.pdf
(compelled speech doctrine protects t-shirt producer, with an announced and adhered-to
policy   of   “refusing any order that [would] endorse positions that would conflict with the
[religious]   convictions   of   the   ownership,”   from   an   order   to   produce   shirts   that   say   “gay  
pride.”)  In  a  much  briefer  part  of  the  opinion,  the  Kentucky  court  also  ruled  that  imposing  
liability  on  the  producer  would  violate  the  state’s  religious  freedom  statute.  For  discussion  
of the many issues that may arise in connection with a compelled speech defense to a
discrimination case against a wedding vendor, see Andrew Koppelman, A Zombie in the
Supreme Court: The Elane Photography Cert. Denial, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV
(forthcoming 2016); Mark Strasser, Speech, Association, Conscience, and the First
Amendment’s  Orientation, 91 DENVER L. REV. 495 (2014); Susan Nabet, Note, For Sale:
The Threat of State Public Accommodations Law to the First Amendment Rights of Artistic
Businesses, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1515 (2012); James M. Gottry, Note, Just Shoot Me:
Public Accommodation Anti-Discrimination Laws Aim at First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 64 VAND. L. REV. 961 (2011).
In some professions, considerations of ethics or competence may permit declining certain
undertakings, but not declining certain classes of clients. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note
109 (arguing against all religion-based exemptions from anti-discrimination laws in
commercial dealings, but suggesting that a marriage counselor or other professional who
must create bonds of trust with a client may refer to other providers when the client
presents issues to which the professional cannot effectively respond).
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Accordingly, Hobby Lobby will play at most a remote role in the disposition
of the religious liberty issues in Ingersoll. The case has yet to arise that
presents the perfect conflict between strong vendor-supportive norms of
religious exemption, and strong consumer-supportive norms of antidiscrimination.
B. Hobby Lobby in the State Legislative Politics to Come
As noted above, twenty-two states have anti-discrimination laws that
cover LGBT people, twenty-one states have RFRA’s,   and only four have
both.172 The arithmetic is simple – thirty-nine states have one or the other
but not both (22 + 21, minus the overlap of 4). That means eleven states
have neither a RFRA nor a state-wide LGBT anti-discrimination law. These
include socially conservative strongholds like Georgia, Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska. As discussed further below, Arkansas
and Indiana have recently enacted RFRAs, though Indiana, after
tremendous national pressure, carved out anti-discrimination laws from its
coverage.173 In March 2015, in Utah, the prominent and influential Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints joined with LGBT rights groups to
present a compromise package, which soon became law. 174 Obergefell v.
172

The District of Columbia also has both, because it is subject to federal RFRA.
Tony Cook, Tom LoBianco & Doug Stanglin, Indiana Governor Signs Amended
Religious Freedom Law, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2015, 6:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2015/04/02/indiana-religious-freedom-law-deal-gay-discrimination/7081
9106/. I am a co-signatory to a letter critical of the original Indiana proposals. See Letter
from Katherine Franke, Isidor & Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia
University et al., to Ed DeLaney, Representative of Indiana (Feb. 27, 2015), available at
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/law_professors_
letter_on_indiana_rfra.pdf. I was also co-signatory to a similarly critical letter regarding the
unsuccessful Georgia proposal. Letter from Ira C. Lupu et al., F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis
Professor of Law Emeritus, George Washington University, to Governor Nathan Deal, et
al. (Jan. 21, 2015), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/
gender-sexuality/georgia-religious-freedom-letter.pdf (containing critical analysis of
original Georgia proposal).
174
See S.B.   296,   2015   Leg.,   2015   Gen.   Sess.   (Utah   2015)   (containing   Utah’s  
Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, which outlaw discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment and housing, but not public
accommodations, with exceptions for religious organizations and the Boy Scouts),
available at http://le.utah.gov/~2015/bills/static/SB0296.html. The Church had previously
signaled it was open to such non-discrimination proposals, but only if such laws respected
the religious freedom of those who objected to same sex intimacy and marriage. Michelle
Boorstein & Abbby Ohlheiser, Mormon Church Announces Support for Legal Protections
for Gay People, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
173
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Hodges, which mandates marriage equality under the 14th Amendment,
invites the strong possibility of more such negotiations, initiated by both
sides.175
In appraising the relative bargaining power of the competing factions
under current conditions, it is instructive to recall the last major round of
legislative fights. They occurred in mostly blue states, and the issues arose
in relation to legislative recognition of marriage equality. Between 2009 and
2014, a number of states enacted such legislation,176 and religious freedom
concerns rose and fell in what became a predictable course. First and
foremost, religious opponents of marriage equality did not show up to
bargain; they came to block the new laws. Their basic position was full
opposition to marriage equality.177
A group of scholars, some of whom supported same-sex marriage,
approached the issues differently. This group, frequently led by Professor
Douglas Laycock and Professor Robin Wilson, focused on the concern for
religious liberty in the context of changes in the law of marriage. They
argued consistently that marriage equality laws should include specific
provisions exempting: 1) clergy and houses of worship from any obligation
to cooperate in same sex weddings; 2) religious non-profits from any
obligation to provide family services, such as adoption or marriage
counseling, to same sex couples; 3) public employees and officials from any
obligation to issue licenses or otherwise cooperate in achieving legal status
for same sex marriages; 4) small businesses that sell goods and services
from the obligation to supply them to same sex weddings, unless the denial
would cause substantial hardship; and 5) employers from any obligation to

local/wp/2015/01/27/mormon-church-to-announce-support-for-legal-protections-for-gaypeople/.
175
Conversations in Indiana in the fall of 2015 suggest the difficulties of finding
common ground. Stephanie Wang, Can Indiana Compromise on LGBT Rights, Religious
Liberty?, INDY STAR (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/
2015/10/03/can-indiana-compromise-lgbt-rights-religious-liberty/73225792/.
176
Professor Tuttle and I documented and analyzed that last round in detail in Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 159 (discussing various provisions of then-new same sex marriage laws
in New Hampshire, New York, DC, Vermont, Maine, Connecticut).
177
See, e.g., THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/ (last
visited Sept. 27, 2015) (containing writings on marriage, both before and after Obergefell);
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE, http://www.nomblog.com/ (last visited Sept.
27, 2015) (same). See also Statement Calling for Constitutional Resistance to Obergefell v.
Hodges, supra note 37.
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treat same sex marriages as valid – for example, in the provision of fringe
benefits to spouses.178
At that time, the legislative resolution of these fall-back demands were
quite similar, state to state. As Professor Tuttle and I documented the scene,
state legislatures always included the exemptions for clergy and houses of
worship, who had never been covered in the first place by nondiscrimination laws; 179 they sometimes included exemptions for religious
non-profit organizations from antidiscrimination laws covering the
beneficiaries of services, though the exemptions applied only if these
organizations were funded through exclusively private sources;180 and they
never included exemptions for public employees, commercial vendors, or
private, secular employers. This pattern reflected the distribution of political
power between the camps in the blue states, where support for marriage
equality far exceeded support for broad religious exemptions.
The pattern also reflected a sound comprehension of constitutional
principles. Clergy and houses of worship are off-limits from state regulation
with respect to conferral of blessings and sacraments.181 Public employees
are already regulated by the Constitution. 182 Commercial vendors and
private, secular employers are subject to extensive regulation, and present a
deeply unsympathetic case on policy grounds for religious exemption.183

178

For a collection of letters to state legislators making these and similar proposals, see
Berg, supra note 102. For a set of arguments in opposition to such a proposal in the Illinois
Legislature, see Letter from Professor Dale Carpenter and Other Religious Liberty Scholars
Opposing  Illinois  “Marriage  Conscience  Protection”  Provisions  (Oct.  23,  2013),   available
at http://perma.cc/5PXG-JG69. I was among the signatories to this letter. Id.
179
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159, at 275.
180
Connecticut is the leading example of this. See id. at 299.
181
Id. at 282-86. Selection of clergy also represents a purely ecclesiastical question, one
that the state is not constitutionally competent to answer. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694.
182
See discussion in Part I supra text accompanying notes 25-44. For development of
this point, see also Memorandum from the Public Rights/Private Conscience Project to the
Interested Parties of Columbia University Sch. of Law (June 30, 2015), available at
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/marriage_
exemptions_memo_june_30.pdf. The recent Utah legislation is relevant to this discussion.
See Utah S.B. 297, supra note 48, § 7, lines 201-205 (allowing individual employees to opt
out of providing marriage services); id. § 1, lines 72-78 (ensuring that every county in the
state will provide marriage services to all eligible couples). Under both Equal Protection
and Establishment Clause principles, any accommodations of public employees with
respect to duties toward same sex couples must be designed to do no harm, either by
dignitary injury or discriminatory delay.
183
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159, at 286-295. See also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 109.

2015]

Moving Targets

53

Religious non-profits fall into an intermediate zone of constitutional and
policy concern.184
That was five years ago, when marriage equality was the focus of the
legislation. That focus invited the possibility of bargains over marriage
equality and religious liberty. In  today’s  circumstances,  marriage equality is
no longer the product of legislation; it is the outcome of litigation in the
federal courts, and, for the moment, that litigation does not involve any
questions whatsoever of religious freedom. For purposes of legislative
bargaining about anti-discrimination norms and competing religious
freedom concerns, the current context resembles the period between 2003
and 2008, when state courts were doing the work of marriage equality under
state constitutions, 185 and religious exemptions were similarly not on the
table.
When courts are adjudicating the marriage question, as was the case
between 2003 and 2008, and is again today, the bargaining leverage for
those seeking religious accommodation is considerably less than in the days
when legislatures were the center of policy making on marriage. 186 The
marriage equality campaign no longer needs legislatures, in red states or
otherwise. In seeking broad anti-discrimination legislation, however, the
LGBT rights camp does indeed need legislatures. State legislatures in the
most religiously conservative states will be the most difficult in which to
make such progress, and the most receptive to religious exemptions if
progress were to be made.187
If such broad LGBT rights legislation becomes politically plausible in
conservative states, now or in the future, those who seek religious
exemptions from it will also be seeking legislative cooperation. Explicit
exemptions are obviously the strongest defense against any obligations not
to discriminate. For example, in Kansas in the spring of 2014, legislators
introduced a proposal entitled   “AN   ACT   concerning   religious   freedoms
184

Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159, at 295-305. For a recent analysis of this set of
problems, see Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 25 (2015).
185
We collect the state court decisions, with relevant citations, in Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 159, at 274 n.2 (citing decisions from Massachusetts, Iowa, California, Connecticut,
and Vermont).
186
See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same Sex Marriage and
Religious Liberty Protections, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2014).
187
Compare the new Utah legislation (S.B. 296 and S.B. 297), discussed supra note 44.
It addresses discrimination in employment and housing, but not in public accommodations,
and creates explicit exemptions for religious entities and the Boy Scouts, but not for
businesses. Id.
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with respect to marriage.” 188 The proposal would have very specifically
precluded   the   imposition   of   any   legal   duty   on   an   “individual   or   religious  
entity”   to   provide   any   services   or   goods   related   to any marriage or to the
celebration  of  any  marriage,  or  any  legal  duty  to  “treat  any  marriage  .  .  .  as  
valid.”189 The   proposed   law   defined   “religious   entity”   to   include   privately  
held, for-profit businesses as well as non-profit entities. 190 Such explicit
exemptions,  however,  invite  the  most  virulent  political  attacks  as  “licenses  
to   discriminate.” The proposed Kansas law was indeed an effort to
preemptively bar the application of yet non-existent anti-discrimination
norms to businesses, public employees, and others who objected on
religious grounds to same-sex unions. As such, the proposal triggered a
firestorm of criticism, and the state senate eventually rejected it.191
In the spring of 2015, as the national constitutional mandate of
marriage equality loomed ever closer, other states began to consider such
explicit exemptions from any legal duties, present or future, to treat all
marriages equally. 192 Most prominent among these was Louisiana’s  
proposed Marriage and Conscience Act,193 which would have protected all
persons (including corporations) from any adverse action by the state in
response   to   an   “act[]   in   accordance   with   a   religious   belief   or   moral  
conviction   about   the  institution  of  marriage.”194 Governor Jindal and some
188

H.B. 2453, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2014 (Kan. 2014), available at
http://perma.cc/3FJT-DM42.
189
Id. § 1(c).
190
Id. § 3(a).
191
Bryan Lowry, Kansas Senate Leaders Kill Controversial Religious Freedom Bill,
WICHITA EAGLE (Feb. 18, 2014), http://perma.cc/5UWU-HHLV. The Arizona episode
followed soon thereafter. Aaron Blake, Arizona Governor Vetoes Controversial Bill
Allowing Denial of Services to Gays, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/02/26/arizona-governorvetoes-controversial-bill-allowing-denial-of-service-to-gays/.
192
The ACLU maintains a data base with a complete list of such recent proposals. AntiLGBT Religious Refusals Legislation Across the Country, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/
anti-lgbt-religious-refusals-legislation-across-country?redirect=lgbt-rights/anti-lgbt-religiou
s-refusals-legislation-across-country#mare (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
193
H.B. 707, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/
legis/BillInfo.aspx?s=15RS&b=HB707&sbi=y.
194
Id. §   5245   A   (“Notwithstanding   any   other   law   to   the   contrary,   this   state   shall   not  
take any adverse action against a person, wholly or partially, on the basis that such person
acts in accordance with a religious belief or moral conviction about the institution of
marriage.”).  A  similar,  unsuccessful  proposal  appeared  in  Texas.  See H.B. 2553, 84th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2015), available at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/
Text.aspx?LegSess=84R&Bill=HB2553 (“Sec. 606.001.RIGHT TO REFUSE TO
PROVIDE GOODS OR SERVICES. (a) A private business owner may refuse to provide
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legislators were in support, but many large business interests, LGBT rights
groups, and religious leaders were sharply critical, and the proposal died.195
Until the spring of 2015, in the many states where explicit exemptions
cannot get political approval, a second best solution for exemption
supporters had been a generic religious freedom statute like a RFRA. These
once had the virtues and vices of vagueness. They do not mention marriage,
and it is impossible to predict with certainty whether a RFRA can be
successfully invoked as a defense to a private or government-instituted
action against a discriminator.196
In the spring of 2014, Professor Thomas Berg described the
atmosphere for generic religious freedom protections in state law as
“toxic,”197 because of the perceived association between religious freedom
and hostility to LGBT rights. If such a perception was at that time held only
among rights activists and a few scholars, the circumstances have now
changed dramatically. In the current political and cultural climate, proposed
goods or services to any person based on a sincerely held religious belief or on
conscientious  grounds.”).  The  proposed  federal  “First  Amendment  Defense  Act,”  discussed  
in Part II, supra, has analogous content.
195
See Emily Lane, Louisiana’s   Religious   Freedom   Bill   Effectively   Defeated   in  
Committee, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 19, 2015), http://www.nola.com/
politics/index.ssf/2015/05/louisianas_religious_freedom_b.html. Governor Jindal described
the opponents of the Bill as being under pressure from radical liberals. Bobby Jindal, I’m  
Holding Firm Against Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/opinion/bobby-jindal-im-holding-firm-against-gaymarriage.html the competing forces. Some   of   Jindal’s   critics   can   hardly   be   described   as  
radical liberals. See Rabbi Gabriel Greenberg, A   Religious   Case   Against   Louisiana’s  
Religious Freedom Bill, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (April 24, 2015),
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2015/04/religious_freedom_louisiana.html. Rabbi
Greenberg is an Orthodox rabbi in Metairie, La. Same sex couples would not be permitted
to marry in his branch of Judaism. Id. Governor Jindal eventually issued an Executive
Order,   “Marriage   and   Conscience   Order,”   which   urges   state   agencies   to   be   respectful   of  
religious conscience in cases involving objectors to same sex marriage. Exec. Order BJ 158, DOA.LA.GOV, available at http://www.doa.louisiana.gov/osr/other/bj15-8.htm (last
visited Sept. 27, 2015). The Order appears to add nothing to existing Louisiana law.
196
Among other possibilities, the discriminator may be shown to be lacking a sincere
religious belief in the duty to avoid complicity in certain activities; or the state may have a
compelling interest in ending the discrimination, even if the prohibition burdens religious
exercise. But none of these outcomes can be predicted with certainty, especially in states
where RFRAs are new, and have been enacted in the shadow of the expected new regime
of marriage equality.
197
Thomas Berg, The   Scholars’   Mississippi   Letter:   RFRAs   in   General   Are   Now   Bad,
MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Mar. 25, 2014), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/
2014/03/the-scholars-mississippi-letter-rfras-in-general-are-now-bad.html
(“[P]olitically
this  is  an  impossibly  toxic  time  to  propose  a  state  RFRA.”).
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RFRAs are a whistle that everyone can hear.198 After Governor Pence of
Indiana   signed   his   state’s   newly   enacted   RFRA   on   March 26, 2015,199 the
NCAA, major business corporations including Apple, Inc., and a broad
array of political leaders immediately mounted great pressure on Indiana
political leaders to clarify that the new law could not be used as a defense to
an action under state or local anti-discrimination law.200 Within days, the
Indiana Legislature had revised the law to so clarify, and the Governor had
signed the amended version.201
How will the Hobby Lobby decision affect this political atmosphere?
More importantly, how will Hobby Lobby affect interpretations by state
courts of their own RFRAs, many of which were enacted years before
marriage equality seemed imminent anywhere in the United States? In
discussions of proposed federal legislation, Hobby Lobby operates directly,
because federal RFRA modifies all of federal law. In considering the impact
of RFRA on rights conferred by new federal law, lawyers can argue about
the scope and meaning of Hobby Lobby, but not about its applicability.
Thus, as discussed in Part II above, lobbyists and federal legislators will

198

Erik Eckholm, Religious Protection Laws, Once Called Shields, Are Now Seen as
Cudgels, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/us/politics/
religious-protection-laws-once-called-shields-are-now-seen-as-cudgels.html.
199
Indiana: Bill Signed Allowing Denial of Service to Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/us/politics/indiana-bill-signed-allowing-denial
-of-service-to-gays.html. See also Here   It   Is:   The   Text   of   Indiana’s   ‘Religious   Freedom’  
Law, INDYSTAR (Apr. 2, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/
politics/2015/03/27/text-indianas-religious-freedom-law/70539772/.
200
The State of Indiana does not have a law that forbids discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity, but Indianapolis does, as do other local governments in
Indiana. See, e.g., INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 581-101 (2008). Controversy over these
issues continues in Indiana. Stephanie Wang, supra note 175.
201
Wesley Lowery, Gov. Pence Signs Revised Indiana Religious Freedom Bill Into
Law, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/04/02/gov-pence-signs-revised-indiana-religious-freedom-bill-into-law/.
See also Conference Committee Report, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
1699997-read-the-updated-indiana-religious-freedom.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2015)
(containing the clarifying amendment to the Indiana RFRA). An earlier version of the
amendment applied only to discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity,
and only to public accommodations. Tony Cook, Tom LoBianco & Brian Eason, Gov.
Mike Pence Signs RFRA Fix, INDYSTAR (Apr. 2, 2015, 8:08 PM),
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/01/indiana-rfra-deal-sets-limitedprotections-for-lgbt/70766920. The final, enacted version includes all covered categories of
forbidden discrimination (race, sex, etc.), and all contexts (including housing, public and
private employment, and public accommodations) in which discrimination is forbidden. Id.
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negotiate in the shadow of the uncertain legal principles for which Hobby
Lobby stands.
When state courts interpret their own state’s   RFRA, however, Hobby
Lobby operates only at the level of potentially persuasive, rather than
binding, authority. If a state has a RFRA, Hobby Lobby may influence the
state   courts’   construction   of   it. The most likely influence would be in the
direction of pushing recognition of corporations, or other business entities,
as   “persons”   who   can   mount   RFRA   claims. 202 Such a move is not
dispositive; it opens the door for certain claims but does not guide the court
to their ultimate resolution.203
On dispositive questions, however, such as whether a state interest in
preventing discrimination will usually or always trump religious exercise,
Hobby Lobby is a far less reliable predictor of what state courts will do.
From the perspective of those who seek the widest possible set of religious
exemptions, Hobby Lobby might be viewed as significantly increasing the
pre-existing likelihood that state courts would apply RFRA in favor of a
religiously motivated discriminator.
First, Hobby Lobby seemed unreceptive to the argument that actual or
potential harm to third parties will necessarily be fatal to a successful RFRA
claim.204 If state courts reasoned similarly, they would reject the argument
202

Lupu, supra note 11, at 99. See also Frank S. Ravitch, Be Careful What You Wish
For: Why Hobby Lobby Weakens Religious Freedom, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV (forthcoming
2015) at [SSRN version] 37-44, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2587503). For a recent example of a state court mechanically following Hobby
Lobby on the question of corporate personhood, see Hands-On Originals, Inc. v. LexingtonFayette  Urban  Cnty.  Human  Rights  Comm’n,  No.  14-CI-04474, at 14 (Fayette Cir. Ct. 3d
Div. 2015), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HandsOnOriginalsDecision.pdf.
203
If I were advising a state legislature on this coverage issue in light of Hobby Lobby, I
would suggest that courts   are   highly   likely   to   construe   “person”   in   a   RFRA   as   covering  
business entities, including corporations, unless the legislation or its history clearly indicate
otherwise. The law of many states includes a presumption to this effect. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN., §1-3-3 (14) (2010). See also Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 485 S.E.2d
22 (Ga. 1997) (stating that "[a] corporation is a 'person'" and citing §1-3-3 to support that
proposition).
204
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (characterizing the harm as a refusal to extend
benefits to third parties). The most strenuous version of this argument appears in Frederick
Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassel, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
343, 356–71 (2014). Professor Nelson Tebbe has proposed in testimony to a Congressional
Committee that RFRA be amended to clarify that a showing of material harm to third
parties would always be fatal to a RFRA claim or defense. Oversight of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil
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by a victim of discrimination that a decrease in convenience, access to
goods, or respect in the marketplace necessarily trumped a RFRA claim to
be free to refuse to engage in commerce with certain customers.
Second, in holding that commercial entities can escape regulation as a
result   of   their   owners’   religious   commitments, Hobby Lobby disconnected
RFRA from the limitations associated with prior free exercise clause
principles, particularly those strongly stated in U.S. v. Lee. 205 Lee had
appeared to lay down a hard and fast rule that business entry constituted a
form of waiver of religious objection to general business regulation.206 To
the extent state courts had been committed to tracking such principles in
their own RFRA interpretations, Hobby Lobby might lead state court judges
to feel freer to abandon those principles.
Third, in dicta, Hobby Lobby singled out only race discrimination as a
concern of civil rights law that religious freedom should not be able to
trump.207 This prominent omission of discrimination based on sex, religion,
national origin, or LGBT status suggests that the government interests in
eradicating any of those categories of discrimination might not be
compelling, and that religious freedom might therefore prevail over such
interests. This omission was of particular and obvious alarm to advocates of
equality rights for women as well as members of the LGBT community.
These propositions, if imported into state court interpretations of
RFRAs, make such laws considerably more potent in their application to
discrimination disputes. 208 The awareness of that potential potency,
however, contributes substantially to the atmospheric toxicity of RFRAs,
Justice, 114th Cong. (2015), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/497441bcb2fa-4b10-8ade-91f6603588fe/tebbe-02132015.pdf.
205
U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982). See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783-84. For
comment on this aspect of Hobby Lobby, see William P. Marshall, Bad Statutes Make Bad
Law: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71 (2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2562949; James M. Oleske, Jr., The
Born Again Champion of Conscience, 18 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 75, 87-90 (2015) (book
review).
206
“When   followers   of   a   particular   sect   enter   into   commercial   activity   as   a   matter   of  
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are
not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that
activity.”  Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
207
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
208
State RFRAs will also be more potent if the courts construe them to apply to private
rights of action. For discussion of the conflict among the Circuits on this question as
applied to federal RFRA, see Shruti Chaganti, Note, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Provides a Defense in Suits by Private Parties, 99 VA. L. REV. 343 (2013).
Hobby Lobby did not address this question.
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both in legislative deliberations such as those in Indiana, and in future
adjudication. Moreover, when viewed from the perspective of the strongest
proponents of LGBT rights, Hobby Lobby may be seen as much narrower
than the supporters of RFRAs might believe. In particular, Hobby Lobby
was grounded on the potential availability to for-profits of the
accommodation that the government had made available to religious nonprofits.209 The ultimate scope of the Hobby Lobby principle may depend on
the extent to which government can respect religious liberty without
undermining  the  government’s  programmatic goals.210
The aftermath of Hobby Lobby for state legislative deliberations has
thus become an ironic dance between RFRA proponents and opponents.
The RFRA proponents assert the great importance of religious liberty,
suggest that state RFRAs have been weakly construed, and downplay the
force of Hobby Lobby, which may have strengthened the hand of federal
RFRA claimants. 211 The RFRA opponents can point to and emphasize
Hobby Lobby as a danger signal of impending illiberal interpretations, while
simultaneously suggesting that Hobby Lobby is less serious a setback for
reproductive rights than might be feared.212
In this political climate, it is easy to see the possibility of endless
legislative stalemate on LGBT rights and religious freedom. Champions of
religious liberty will prefer broad and explicit religious exemptions, not
209

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-83. See also id. at 2785-87 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). The Obama Administration has now extended that accommodation to closely
held corporations. See Coverage of Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 80
Fed. Reg. 41318 et seq., (July 14, 2015), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2015-07-14/pdf/2015-17076.pdf.
210
Although the accommodation for religious nonprofits has now been extended to a
narrow class of closely held for-profit firms, see id. at 41323-41328, female employees,
and female dependents of all employees, of the firms that prevailed in the litigation
involving for-profit firms have been deprived of the relevant coverage since at least the end
of June 2014, and will not receive coverage until the beginning of the next health plan year.
Id. at 41322.
211
See, e.g., Letter from Douglas Laycock et al., Professor of Law, University of
Virginia, to Hon. Same Teasley, Georgia House of Representatives (Feb. 19, 2015),
available at https://cmgajcpolitics.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/georgia-hb-218.pdf. See
also Letter from Douglas Laycock et al., Professor of Law, University of Virginia, to Hon.
Brent Steele, Chair of the Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee, at 5, (Feb. 3, 2015),
available
at
http://www.faithlafayette.org/uploads/Church/LetterSupportingReligious
FreedomRestoration.pdf. (“In  narrow  circumstances,  some  claims  to exemption from antidiscrimination laws might properly succeed, especially when the anti-discrimination laws
reach  into  religiously  sensitive  contexts.”)  
212
See, e.g., Lupu, et al., Letter to Nathan Deal, Governor of Georgia, supra note 173.
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subject to judicial interest-balancing, for commercial vendors and public
employees, as well as for clergy and religious institutions. Proponents of
LGBT rights will be extremely unwilling to concede these explicit
exemptions with respect to commerce and public employees, for fear of
gutting  the  legislation’s  thrust. With respect to public servants, in particular,
LGBT rights proponents will be rightly concerned about undermining the
thrust of Obergefell. On the practical level, exemptions allow escape from
anti-discrimination norms; on the symbolic level, exemptions legitimize
anti-LGBT attitudes in the name of faith.
Nor will proposed enactment of RFRAs, with their vague terms and
interpretive uncertainties, operate to fully diffuse the opposition to LGBT
rights legislation. RFRA proponents who are elected officials will be
unwilling to identify the extent to which their agenda is the creation of a
faith-based license to discriminate. In any event, RFRA supporters can have
no confidence that courts will construe the statute to facilitate religious
objections by vendors to providing goods and services to same-sex couples,
or objections by public employees to serving same sex couples.
By the same token of uncertainty, however, LGBT rights supporters
will be unwilling to accept RFRAs, unless an Indiana-style exclusion of
anti-discrimination laws is included. These groups will lack confidence that
courts won’t so construe the statute, especially after LGBT rights groups
have warned of precisely that danger.213 Moreover, RFRA opponents can
also credibly argue that, at the margin, RFRAs may embolden potential
discriminators 214 and discourage litigation by their victims. At the very
least, the presence of a RFRA changes the bargaining power of both sides,
pre-litigation as well as in any settlement phase.
Working out a modus vivendi between LBGT rights and religious
freedom was inevitably going to be very difficult in the short run. Hobby
Lobby has considerably aggravated this problem,215 and Obergefell will do
little or nothing to neutralize the conflict. Time and cultural change,
213

Id. at 4-7.
See Paxton Opinion, supra note 38, at 2-4. Sections   1   and   2   of   Governor   Jindal’s  
“Marriage   and   Conscience   Order,”   http://www.doa.louisiana.gov/osr/other/bj15-8.htm,
explicitly rely on the Louisiana RFRA for authority. Exec. Order BJ 15-8, supra note 201,
as does the Memorandum from Thomas Enright, Executive Counsel, Office of Governor
Bobby Jindal to Interested Parties (June 29, 2015), available at http://gov.louisiana.gov/
index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=5012.
215
See generally Frank S. Ravitch, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why Hobby Lobby
Weakens Religious Freedom, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV (forthcoming) at [SSRN version] 37-44,
(describing effect of Hobby Lobby on political deliberations over a proposed RFRA, which
was not enacted, in Michigan as well as deliberations in other states).
214
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however, are on the side of LGBT rights proponents. I would encourage
them to hold out for good deals later, and not make bad ones now.
In an atmosphere so charged, is it possible that strong LGBT rights
proposals can advance in conservative states? Utah managed such a feat, but
only because of an unusual degree of cooperation and mutual respect
between a single, dominant religious actor and LGBT rights groups. And
even in Utah, legislation about public accommodations was left off the
table, so the wedding vendor question was not resolved. Moreover, the Utah
law was enacted against a longstanding background of broad exemptions
from anti-discrimination laws for religiously affiliated organizations. 216
Except for this recent example, these qualities of cooperation and mutual
respect have been close to invisible in these fights over the past twenty
years.217
The remaining context for bargaining involves the interests of
religiously affiliated social service organizations in being free to use their
own parameters for distribution of social and family services. 218 Such
services may have the quality of ministries, and our strong constitutional
tradition is that privately supported religious ministries set their own criteria
for who deserves and gets their help. This is only one short step removed
from recognition that religious communities are autonomous in distribution
of blessings and sacraments.219
216

See Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, & Micah Schwartzman, Utah  ‘Compromise’  
to Protect LGBT Citizens from Discrimination is No Model for the Nation, SLATE (Mar. 18,
2015 3:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/18/gay_rights_the_utah_
compromise_is_no_model_for_the_nation.html (explaining   why   Utah’s   background   legal  
circumstances make the Utah compromise a poor model for other states or the United
States). But see J. Stuart Adams & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Protecting Religious Equality
Requires Protections for All, THE CORNERSTONE BLOG (July 31, 2014),
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/cornerstone/rfra-in-indiana-and-beyond/responses/
protecting-religious-liberty-requires-protections-for-all (praising the Utah compromise).
217
For an impressive recent call for mutual respect and appropriate forbearance in
litigation, see Steve Sanders, RFRA and Reasonableness, IND. L.J. (forthcoming), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2661587.
218
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159, at 296-305. Note that a recent Michigan proposal,
which did not succeed, would have permitted publicly funded religious social service
agencies to discriminate against same sex couples. See Kathleen Gray, Religious Liberty
Bills Reemerge in State Legislature, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 23, 2015, 9:02AM),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/22/religious-liberty-bills-resurfacestate-legislature/23846599/.
219
Nor is there any reasonable ground for apprehension that religious entities will lose
their tax exempt status under state law because of their teachings on same sex intimacy. Cf.
Sam Brunson, The Church Will Not Lose its Tax Exempt Status, BY COMMON CONSENT
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Once these entities accept public funds or operate under public
licensure, however, this right to exclude beneficiaries based on religious
criteria becomes deeply problematic.220 Although neither receipt of public
funds nor state licensure makes the recipient a state actor,221 both involve a
version of official imprimatur on the recipient’s qualifications and
performance of the service. Public funding involves the support of all
taxpayers, whether or not they approve of the particular grantee or its
policies, as well as discretionary decisions by public officials to allocate the
funds to particular grantees. As recognized by the policies of the FaithBased and Community Initiative under President George W. Bush,
beneficiaries should never be turned away on religious grounds from a
publicly supported charity.222
Licensure alone may present a closer question. Unlike public funding
streams, which supplement private generosity, license requirements
interfere with private freedoms, albeit in the good name of quality control
over the licensed personnel or enterprise. This is a context for compromise
and bargaining, where considerations of utility will play a part.223 If enough
services—for example, in matters of foster care, or adoption—are available
for all who need them, including those whose sexual orientation and/or
gender identity will make them unwelcome in some quarters, perhaps
licenses need not come with strong anti-discrimination requirements for
religious providers. In the case of a provider that dominates the service
(July 9, 2015), http://bycommonconsent.com/2015/07/09/the-church-will-not-lose-its-taxexempt-status/. I have seen no evidence that states are more aggressive than the federal
government on such matters.
220
See Brownstein, supra note 133, at 428. Indirect, or voucher-based, funding, does
not implicate the government to the same extent in actions by the religious entity that
redeems the vouchers, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), so long as the
voucher arrangements do not steer beneficiaries into religious experience. Nevertheless,
beneficiaries should not, on religious grounds, be made ineligible for voucher-funded
programs. For discussion of the various issues raised by indirect funding, see generally Ira
C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s   Future:   Vouchers,   Sectarian   Providers,   and   the  
Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917 (2003); see also Ira C.
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government
Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J. L. & POL. 537 (2002).
221
See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972) (receipt of liquor license does
not make licensee a state actor); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (receipt of
public funds does not transform private actor into state actor); accord, Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
222
Exec. Order No. 13279, 3 CFR § 13279.2(d) (Dec. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2002-12-16/pdf/02-31831.pdf.
223
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159, at 297-303.
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market and treats LGBT people in a discriminatory or disrespectful way,
however, continued state licensure would be oppressive and unfair.
Whether negotiations over such matters can solve the empirical
problem of determining sufficiency of providers, as well as the problem of
political   symbolism   in   affirming   a   “license   to   discriminate”   (even   among  
religiously affiliated non-profits), remains to be seen. To the extent
legislation is necessary to guarantee the freedom of religious organizations
to exclude beneficiaries based on LGBT status, there is no reason for LGBT
rights advocates to concede on this point unless they are getting new and
valuable anti-discrimination laws in exchange.
C. Hobby Lobby and the Future of State Court Adjudication
As chronicled above, there has yet been no case in which a state
RFRA, modeled after federal RFRA, is put into square conflict with an antidiscrimination law. 224 The possible expansion of anti-discrimination laws
into states that already have RFRAs increases the probability that such a
case will arise. When that happens – for example, with respect to a wedding
vendor, or a private employer who refuses on religious grounds to recognize
a same sex spouse for purposes of fringe benefits – how should we expect
the arguments to unfold? In particular, what role will Hobby Lobby play?
Recall the discussion in Part I of this paper of the elements of a federal
RFRA claim or defense. A party who relies on RFRA must demonstrate a
substantial burden on her sincere religious exercise. If the claimant is
unsuccessful on any of those points – sincerity, religiosity, burden, or
substantiality – the claim will fail. If the claimant is successful on those
points, which are frequently undisputed, the risk of non-persuasion shifts to
whoever is opposing the RFRA claim. That party must show that denying
the   requested   exemption   is   the   “least   restrictive   alternative”   to   “furthering  
[a]  compelling  governmental  interest.”
State RFRAs tend to be very similar in their terms, and one would
expect state court interpretations to converge around the interpretations of
federal RFRA and those of other state RFRAs. In the past, as Professor
Christopher Lund has demonstrated,225 those convergences have been in the
224

Elane Photography would have been such a case if the New Mexico Supreme Court
had  not  construed  the  state’s  RFRA  to  be  inapplicable  to  a  private  lawsuit.
225
Christopher Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55
S.D.L. REV 466, 477 n.67, tbl I (2010). See also Lupu, supra note 11 at 69-71 (suggesting
not much has changed regarding interpretations of state RFRAs since Professor Lund
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direction of weak interpretation. This has enabled the supporters of recently
proposed state RFRAs, such as in Indiana, to portray these Bills as
representing only marginal changes in the legal status quo.226 The looming
question after Hobby Lobby is whether future state interpretations will
strengthen the hand of religious objectors. In the broader, conceptual terms I
suggested in Part I of this article, does Hobby Lobby represent a major step
toward expanding and normalizing the concept of religious privilege in the
law?
In the immediate wake of Hobby Lobby, I expressed the view that state
courts would continue to weakly construe state RFRAs.227 I confess that in
appraising the situation going forward, I am slightly less confident than I
once was. The rapid and explosive surge of marriage equality, arriving in
conservative states by court order, inevitably will invite some form of
political and cultural response. Very little of the response will take the form
of public defiance of the sort demonstrated in Alabama by its Chief Judge
and its Supreme Court. 228 Continued discrimination against same sex
couples, in defiance of a federal court order, will invite injunctions,
contempt citations, and significant awards of attorneys fees. 229 Moreover,
no state is going to permanently shut down the institution of marriage for
different sex couples in order to stop same sex couples from getting its
benefits.
Under current conditions, what should we expect from state courts?
What difference, if any, will Hobby Lobby make as persuasive, but not
binding, authority? The most important quality of Hobby Lobby to note in
this regard is its partial liberation from, and partial adherence to, the Free
published his article, save perhaps in Texas). The effects of Hobby Lobby, however, have
yet to be seen.
226
Letter from Douglas Laycock et al., Professor of Law, University of Virginia, to
Hon. Brent Steele, Chair of the Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee, 4-5 (Feb. 3, 2015),
available
at
http://www.faithlafayette.org/uploads/Church/LetterSupportingReligious
FreedomRestoration.pdf (asserting that state   and   federal   RFRAs   “have   been   very  
cautiously  enforced.”)
227
Lupu, supra note 11, at 98-100.
228
See Ex parte State of Ala., supra note 8. See also, Alabama Judge: Feds Should
Issue Same Sex Marriage Licenses, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 8, 2015),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/0857f8d3607a4f959196bbc0a93147e3/alabama-judge-fedsshould-issue-same-sex-marriage-licenses.
229
Procedural issues may continue to be important in any continued litigation over
marriage equality. For analysis of the role played by these issues on the path to Obergefell,
see Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 42
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2641943.
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Exercise Clause precedents that many thought had been restored by federal
RFRA. Before Hobby Lobby, lawyers had some confidence in the vitality of
the Supreme  Court’s  firm  statement  in  U.S. v. Lee about those who enter the
commercial realm being unable to superimpose their own faith-based limits
“on  the  [regulatory]  schemes  .  .  . binding  on  others  in  that  activity.”230 That
confidence has now been washed away. Under federal RFRA, commercial
entities, in the corporate form or otherwise, are free to advance religious
objections to regulatory schemes. Moreover, the strong commitment in
Hobby Lobby to the Thomas rule, 231 involving self-declaration of the
substantiality of the religious cost of complying with the law, precludes
judicial second-guessing about the religious weight of the asserted burden
on religious practice.
Liberation from Lee, coupled with adherence to Thomas, represents a
sweet package for commercial enterprises making RFRA claims. Although
state courts need not follow Hobby Lobby in construction of state RFRAs,
these propositions are likely to find their way into state interpretations,
especially in cases where the enactment of a state RFRA has come after
Hobby Lobby. Operationally, that means that few if any cases will be
disposed of by a party not qualifying as  a  “person”  covered  by  RFRA,  or  on  
the   question   of   whether   that   person’s   religious   exercise   has   been  
substantially burdened by an anti-discrimination law. If state law imposes
fines, money damages, or any other legal disability for refusal to serve a
same sex wedding, or refusal to recognize a same sex spouse as eligible for
employee benefits, state courts are likely to find a substantial burden on an
objecting business owner’s  religious  exercise.232
The sincerity question was not litigated in Hobby Lobby, and we know
nothing more about what may become an evolving judicial approach to that
than we did before that decision. I suggested in Part I of this paper that
litigants in the future may challenge more frequently the religious sincerity
of those who engage in discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity. But the lawyers from The Becket Fund and Alliance Defending
230

Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
Thomas, 134 S. Ct. at 2777-79.
232
Direct   imposition   of   civil   damages,   a   fine,   or   imprisonment   for   following   one’s  
religious beliefs will always qualify as a substantial burden on religious exercise.
Wisconsin  v.  Yoder,  406  U.S.  205  (1972).  In  addition,  “where the state conditions receipt
of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon
religion  exists.”  Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981).
231
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Freedom, organizations most likely to mount the earliest test cases of the
sort under discussion here, are experienced and able. They will screen
potential clients, and choose to litigate only on behalf of those who are the
most demonstrably sincere. So, in the earliest, precedent-setting cases, I do
not expect the action to swirl around the question of sincerity.
If this appraisal is correct, the dispositive questions will be 1) the
weight  of  the   government’s  interests  in   denying  religious   exemptions,   and  
2) whether the government has alternative ways of satisfying those interests.
And on these questions, the impact of Hobby Lobby will be either muted, or
positively helpful to those who complain of LGBT discrimination.
Hobby Lobby assumed,   rather   than   decided,   that   the   government’s  
interest in providing full contraceptive coverage to women was
compelling. 233 The need to secure Justice   Kennedy’s   vote,   and   thereby  
make a majority, is the most likely explanation for that assumption,234 but
that is irrelevant in the context of state court interpretations of their own
RFRAs. The assumption drove the case into the ultimate question of
whether the government had ways of satisfying its interests without
burdening the religious exercise of Hobby Lobby and other, comparable
objectors. Because the government had made an accommodation for nonprofits, and in any event might independently assume the costs and
responsibility of full contraceptive insurance, the government could not
justify imposing that responsibility on the religiously objecting firm.235
With respect to laws prohibiting discrimination by sellers of goods and
services, states are protecting two sets of strong interests – material access
to goods and services, and protection against dignitary harm. Proponents of
religious exemptions for vendors of wedding services typically focus on the
former.236 Whatever  the  weight  of  the  state’s interest in guaranteeing access
to goods and services, exemption proponents argue that most vendors will
serve same sex couples, thereby guaranteeing sufficient access to the
relevant goods. In states where exemption proponents have recommended
233

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
Lupu, supra note 11, at 84-85.
235
Id. at 86-90. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-82.
236
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same Sex Marriage
from the Health-Care Context, in SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Douglas
Laycock, et al., eds., 2008); Douglas Laycock, Afterword, id. at 194-201; see also Thomas
Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 N.W.
J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010); Andrew Koppelman, You Can't Hurry Love: Why
Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72
BROOK. L. REV. 125 (2006).
234
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explicit exemptions in the commercial sphere, they have included an
exception for cases in which “a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any
similar good or services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere
without  substantial  hardship.”237 Implicit in such a proposal, which no state
has ever adopted, is that alternative sources of the relevant goods are
usually sufficient to satisfy state interests in ensuring adequate market
access. Only   when   members   of   same   sex   couples   can   prove   “substantial  
hardship,”  by  virtue  of  inadequate  market  alternatives,  would  the  exemption  
not apply.
Analogously, under RFRAs or analogous protections in state
constitutions, objecting vendors argue that the state has an option less
restrictive of religious liberty than full enforcement of anti-discrimination
laws. The  “least  restrictive  alternative”  that  vendors  point  to  in  these  cases  
is the availability of equivalent goods and services from other vendors.238
But satisfaction of  the  state’s  interests  in full and equal access to goods and
services cannot be made to rise and fall on the fluctuating numbers,
frequency, quality, and location of LGBT-friendly vendors.239 To permit a
religious exemption under conditions of empirical uncertainty makes same
sex couples subject to the ever-changing vagaries of market conditions, and
imposes on courts intractable problems of measuring whether markets for
particular goods in specific locations are sufficiently gay-friendly.
Any such regime of exemptions, moreover, invites dignitary injury to
those who are turned away, either to their face or by posted signs, by
vendors. 240 Once this set of concerns is added to the RFRA equation,
237

Letter from Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson et al., to Governor Pat Quinn (Illinois)
4 (Sept. 27, 2015), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/ill-letter-12-2012.pdf.
This proposal is criticized in Letter from Professor Dale Carpenter and Other Religious
Liberty Scholars 9-10 (Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/5PXG-JG69.
238
Ingersoll, No. 13-2-00871-5,  at  50  (describing  and  rejecting  florist’s  argument  that  
referral to another vendor, willing and able to provide the goods, is sufficient to satisfy the
state’s  interest  in  nondiscrimination).  
239
In this Symposium, Andrew Koppelman and Elizabeth Sepper disagree about the
relevant empirical questions. Compare Andrew Koppelman, A Zombie in the Supreme
Court: The Elane Photography Cert. Denial, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV (forthcoming
2016) with Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moral Marketplace, ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV
(forthcoming 2016).
240
The Supreme Court has on several occasions emphasized the dignitary injuries
caused by discrimination. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)
(race discrimination); Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (sex discrimination).
Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity works the same kind of
dignitary injury. The LGBT rights literature has abundantly documented this claim. See,
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vendors should lose, without regard to issues of market access. It is simply
impossible for the government, or the private market, to make alternative
provisions of equal dignity for victims of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity. The government cannot supply their
dignitary wellbeing as they, in their roles as citizens, consumers, tenants,
and employees, interact with others.241
Even in conservative states, these dignitary interests should be the
trump card in this game. Moreover, the dignitary interests at stake are
unusually strong in cases about the provision of goods and services in
connection with the ceremonies or status of marriage. Some of the religious
objectors are wont to say that they are more than willing to have LGBT
employees and customers;242 the objectors just draw their religious line at
marriage. However authentically this posture captures their religious
sentiment, it is spectacularly tone-deaf and insulting. The act of marrying
represents a high point in the lives of many couples, particularly those
same-sex couples who have lived for many years deprived by law and
custom of such opportunities. Their actual and perceived status as being
married, with the identical social, moral, and legal force as different sex
couples, is of profound significance to their sense of equal citizenship. For a
vendor, employer, or public official to discriminate against them with
respect to their wedding or marital status is a deep assault on their full and
equal place in American society.
The unwilling vendors and other discriminators thus represent
something far more disturbing than a narrowed consumer choice of a cake,
flowers, or banquet hall. They represent a continuing and profound insult to
those whom they refuse to serve. Why they do not have a crisis of
conscience about delivering that blow is a puzzle to me. Forcing them to
alter their policies, or to leave the relevant market, is the least restrictive
e.g., Chai Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME SEX MARRIAGE
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
241
Brownstein, supra note 133, at 420-421.
242
See, e.g., State   of   Washington   v   Arlene’s   Flowers,   Ingersoll   v.   Arlene’s   Flowers:  
Overview, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/
News/PRDetail/8608 (last  visited  Sept.  30,  2015)  (“Barronelle Stutzman, the sole owner of
Arlene’s  Flowers  in  Richland, Washington, has served and employed people who identify
as homosexual for her entire career. Despite this, the American Civil Liberties Union and
the Washington Attorney General claim that she is guilty of unlawful discrimination when
she acted consistent with her faith and declined to use her creative skills to beautify the
same-sex ceremony of a long-time customer, Robert Ingersoll, and another man, Curt
Freed.”)
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means of furthering the compelling governmental interest of equal dignity
for LGBT people. If and when cases of this sort arrive in state courts, I hope
and expect they will be decided on precisely these grounds.243
CONCLUSION
I fully recognize the subversive quality of the argument just advanced.
If I am correct, conservative lawmakers are betraying their constituencies if
they accept a RFRA-type law in exchange for support of an LGBT antidiscrimination law. Conservative lawmakers can only serve the interests of
religious objectors by holding out for explicit exemptions, not subject to
interest balancing by the judiciary, for religious objectors. In its own limited
terms, this was precisely the sort of deal that triumphed in Utah, where both
sides could respectably claim legislative accomplishments.
LGBT rights advocates, under certain political conditions, thus might
accept a proposal with some explicit exemptions for religious nonprofits, in
exchange for a statewide law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity in various contexts. It’s  not  my  place  to  speak  
for the political interests of such communities, but I would respectfully
advise them to walk away from a proposal that extends exemptions to
anyone other than religious institutions, funded entirely from private
sources. Despite Obergefell’s   nod   to   the   existence   of   good   faith   religious  
opinion against same sex marriage, 244 religious objections to same sex
intimacy will ultimately retain no more respect than religious objections to
racial integration and inter-racial intimacy. 245 In a nation committed to a
243

The situation of a state RFRA in conflict with a local anti-discrimination law
presents nothing different. A city or county may have compelling interests – economic as
well as dignitary - in eradicating a form of discrimination, and nothing in the conventional
relationship of state and local government precludes recognition of local interests as
sufficiently compelling to trump state-created rights, of religious liberty or otherwise. In a
number of states, the movement to outlaw such discrimination in employment, housing,
and other spheres of life has been far more successful at the local than at the state level. See
Williams Institute, State Resource Map, supra note 157. For example, Arizona has no such
state-wide law, but Phoenix forbids local discrimination based on LGBT status. Similar
circumstances obtain in Atlanta and other local jurisdictions in Georgia; Austin, Dallas, and
San Antonio in Texas; and Indianapolis and Bloomington, in Indiana. Id. There are many
other such examples.
244
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
245
See Oleske, supra note 59; William B. Eskridge, Jr., It’s  Not  Gay  Marriage  vs.  the  
Church Anymore, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/
opinion/sunday/its-not-gay-marriage-vs-the-church-anymore.html?emc=edit_th_20150426
&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=61084530&_r=0.
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more Perfect Union, the arc of the religious universe is long, but it too
bends toward justice.246

246

For information on the source of the analogous observation about the moral
universe, frequently attributed to Martin Luther King, Jr., see The Arc of the Moral
Universe is Long But it Bends Toward Justice, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR,
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/11/15/arc-of-universe/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). In
his appraisal of the ways in which such a transition among religious conservatives may
occur, Professor Laycock is undoubtedly correct that   “[i]t   makes   all   the   difference   in   the  
world   how   we   get   there.”   Douglas   Laycock,   Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407,  419  (2011).  Every  tactical  choice  of  “how  we  get  
there,”  however,  has  a  different  calculus  of  costs and benefits for each side.

